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PREFACE
I desire to express ray appreciation to the following
persons who have greatly aided In the preparation of this
thes i s :
Doctor A# Stanley Trickett, who served as ray patient
Advisor throughout the period of preparing this paper.
The library staff of the University of Omaha, the
University of Nebraska, Offutt Air Force Base and the
Command and General Staff College,
My wife and family, each of whom aided in some way.
The writer, however, accepts full responsibility for
the material presented.
The Japanese practice of giving family names first
has been followed in referring to Japanese persons.

The

Roraanization of Japanese names after the Senyusha system
has been followed.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The period from 1902 through 1922 is an important
phase in the International relations of Japan.

At the out

set of this period, Nippon signed a defensive Alliance with
Great Britain which served as a warning to the other Europe
an Powers who had interests or designs in the Orient.

A few

years later, Japan astounded the world by defeating Russia
in a war waged because of conflicting ambitions in Manchuria
and Korea.

While Nippon did not obtain a monetary indemnity

from St. Petersburg, she did gain recognition of her para
mount Interests in Korea, territorial and economic conces
sions on the Liaotung peninsula and Manchuria and outright
cession of the southern half of Sakhalin,

Of greater impor

tance was the enhancement of her prestige throughout the
Orient.

At the same time, the European Powers awakened to

the fact that they could no longer encroach with Impunity
upon the mainland of Asia,'**
The Russo-Japanese War was followed by a period in
which Tokyo consolidated her gains on the mainland of Asia

^A.J.P. Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery In Europe
1343-1913 (Oxford:
The~ Clarendon !Press, l9?4), p. 400} G.
Nye Steiger, A History of the Par East (Boston:
Ginn and
Company, 1 9 w t > P P . 716^2$.

toy obtaining agreements with France and Russia,

The exchange

of the Root-Takahira notes of 1906 were interpreted toy the
Tokyo Government as recognition of her existing gains in China
rather than emphasis on the fTopen door,1'

Korea's annexation

was accomplished in 1910 without any official protest by the
West and Tokyo now had a de jure right for a permanent foot
hold in Asia.

The signing of the renewal of the Anglo-Japan

ese Alliance in 1911 gave the .Nipponese firm grounds for
entering the World War,

While her military role was small in

comparison to that of the Western Powers, Tokyo emerged from
the war holding possession of the Klaochow leasehold in Shantung and the German colonies north of the equator.

2

Negotiations at the Peace Conference at Paris were
conducted toy the Tokyo delegation in a largely defensive way.
It was readily evident that they were outmatched in diploma
tic maneuvering by the Chinese with their superior training
in Western techniques of communication and propaganda.

Nip

pon's ultimate victory was 11negative” in the sense that it was
obtained only as a means to save the Conference*-^

Seeds of

2 Stanley K. Hornbeck, Contemporary Politics in the Far
East {New York: D, Appleton and Company, 1926T, pp.
E o m a s E. Ennis, Eastern Asia (Chicago:
J, B. LIppincott Com
pany, 1946), P. 292Z
3

Roy W* Curry, Woodrow WiIson and Far Eastern Policy
(New York; Bookman Associates, l^ST), p.~lT79.

3
doubt were planted and. Treat Britain realized that she m a t

seriousiy weigh the effect* of a .renewal of the Anglo*Japan*
«st Alliance; both as ±t would effect her relations with the
*»
Dominions and the on-,ted i t e a •'■*

Soma tins after the Peace aettle.ment, the Nipponese
somewhat reluctantly agreed to attend a conferance in Wash
ington in 1021 to disc lies the limitation* of armaments and the
problems of the Far East mud the Pacific.

ri m *«*nineton Con

ference culminated ir. the drawing up of a Pour-Power Pact, a
Five-Power K&val Treaty* &

Power Treaty concerning China

i-ne. tbs * s I*tie went of the out,« tan ding problems concerning
Shantung, Yep, end the Jape.uese troops re'main m g
Hr d#r the preset?re of wcr.ld opinion,

in CIberia.

the ‘vokjo O o v c m ^ e n t was

ferot-d ti: give In cn .many issues growing out- of g»ins made at
iht*

? Feace Conference end f'aper, accepted a changed role in

the -ar £&<? t*
It ir the purpose of this thesis to set forth the his
torical dais which directly contributed to Japan1s rise in
Inleruatform 1 power and prertige miring the twenty year peri
od of 19C2-19??.

Fo r*t tcamt hae been made to either justify

^A , Whitney lri;:vold, lar Faoterm £olic*^ of, the, United
States (New York;
Harcourt. Brace "anST Co7. 1936), pp. 273?s?r:
^Steiger, op. c it« > pi>• 789-Bok.

4
or condemn th© Tokyo Government*s role during these years,
but merely to present th© significant historical events as
they occurred*

An attempt has been made to incorporate as

many Japanese works as possible in order to set forth a
balanced history of this period.
In order to better correlate th® events between these
twenty years, it will b© necessary to summarize some of the
more important developments in Japanese internal and foreign
relations from the time of Perry*s visit to Japan in 1853 J a
visit which prompted th© end of the era of isolation.

Japan’s foreign relations prior to the sixteenth cen
tury were mainly limited to contacts with Korea and China.
Indeed, Japan gained most of her culture from China as evi
denced by her adoption of the Chinese method of writing,
painting, sculpture, and family system.

This culture was

transmitted to Japan by her contacts with China, and with
Korea which was under the suzerainty of China*^
The English, Dutch, Portuguese, and Spanish were the
first western nations to enter Japan.

While all of these

nations were primarily interested In commerce, the Portuguese
and Spanish actively attempted to convert the Japanese nation
to Christianity.

Early success attended the efforts to prop

agate the Gospel; between 15^9 and the arrival of Francis
Xavier and the end of the century, some 300,000 Japanese be
came Christians.
In 1636, the shogun lyemitsu expelled all foreigners
1

Robert P. Porter, Japan The Rise of 1a Modern Power
(Oxford:
The Clarendon Press, 1919)» p*
A. L. Kroeger,
Anthropology (Hew York:
Hareourt, Brace and Company), pp.
743-71*4.
2
Porter, £p, cIt., p. 3 6 ; Lawrence II. Battistini,
Japan and America (Hew York:
The John Day Co., 19f?i^), p. 4*

6
from Japan*

Thirteen survivors front a Portuguese ship, which

defied th© edict and entered Nagasaki Bay four years later,
were permitted to return to Macao with the massages

*So long

as the sun warms the earth, any Christian bold enough to come
to Japan, even if he be King Philip himself or the Sod of the
Christians shall pay for it with M s head** As a warning,
3
the rest of th© crew were executed*
While trade with the
Portuguese and .Dutch was permitted, the former were confined
to an artificial islet at Deshima, near Nagasaki| the Netherh
landers faced slra!liar restrictions at Rirado*
In 1853, President Fillmore decided to dispatch a
strong naval fore© to Japan for the dual purpose of retaliat
ing tor affronts and establishing commercial relations with
Japan*

On July 3th of that year, Commodore Matthew 0* Perry

arrived in Japan with a squadron of four paddle-wheel type
ships.

After stopping off at Uraga, Perry sailed into Tokyo

Bay where he presented the

President*© letter to the Japanese

officials and announced to

them that he would return a year

later for an answer*

While the Americans were mainly inter

ested in making arrangements for th® welfare of shipwrecked
American sailors and providing for the refueling and provi
sioning of American ships,

Perry was also interested In ob~

3 Porter, ©£. olt., p. ??»
Ipaysoa «T. Treat, The Far East (Haw Yorks
Brothers, 1923), p. 180,

Harper and

7
taining a foothold in Japan, Korea, the Liu G h 1ius and Formo
sa in order to counteract the expansion of Russia and Engr'
land in the Far East*
At th© time of Perryf3 visit to Japan, the shogun.
or military ruler, actually held th© political and economic
reins of the government, while the Emperor mainly concerned
himself with court matters and the bestowal of titles*

Under

the ahogunate were certain feudal lords or dalmyo who owed
their allegiance to the shogun*
advice of the dalmylo

The shoyunate sought the

after receiving President Fillmore1®

letter and while their opinions were divided, most of them
favored the continuance of the exclusion policy.^
The Russians learned of Perryrs expedition and dis
patched Admiral Putiatln. and. four naval vessels to Nagasaki
with a demand for a boundary settlement as well as th© estab
lishment of trade relations with the Japanese*

However, the

Admiral13 fleet suddenly left in October of 1853 when he
learned that his country was preparing for a war, later to be

^0 hit os hi Yan&ga, Japan Since Perry (Hew York:
McGraw
Hull Book Co*, 191l9), p* c.*i; John F* Smbree, The Japanese
Hation (Hew York:
Farrar and Rinehart, Inc *,1Tfifv'), p p * 12-23•

6Claude

A • .Buss, The Far hast (Hew York:
Company, 1955), pp* lJO-TJT.

Macmillan

8
known as the Crimean Mar.

7

Perry returned to Japan on January 16, 1854 upon learn
ing of Admiral Putiatin* s visit and put in at K&nag&wa to re
ceive the reply to the President1s letter.

The Japanese de

cided to receive the Americans and after the exchange of gifts
and several weeks of negotiations, the Treaty of Kanagawa was
signed on March 31, 1854*

The treaty contained the following
Pt
ten articles which are briefly summarised:
Article I - Peace and amity established between the
United States and Japan.
Article IX - The ports of Shimoda and Hakodate
opened to United States ships.
Article III - In the event of a shipwreck, crews to
be delivered to one of the above two ports.
Article IV - Shipwrecked Americans and fcther United
States citizens are not subject to confinement.
Article V - Shipwrecked Americans are free to travel
within seven miles from Shimoda.
Article VI - . . . .
Article VII - United States ships are permitted to
exchange gold and silver coins for other articles.
Article VIII - Mood, water and provisions are to be
obtained only through authorized Japanese sources.
Article IX - The United States and her citizens are
to be granted any additional rights subsequently granted
to any other nations*
Article X - United States ships are not to enter any
other ports except in an emergency,”
The treaty was not entirely satisfactory to th© United
States since neither one of the two treaty ports was suitable
for commercial trade and because such trade as was permitted

A
~jBinnls, op. clt. s pp. 167-168.

Mould be essentially on a barter basis.

nevertheless,

the

treaty represented a diplomatic advantage over both the
Netherlands and Russia, who failed to obtain a treaty, and It
marked the reopening of Japan to membership in the family of
civilised nations*
Simlliar trestles were negotiated between Japan and
Great Britain,

(October, l851i); H u b s la, (February, 1855)5 and

Holland (January, 1856).

Bv 1856, each of these powers was

given the status of a most favored nation and entitled to:
obtain supplies at Shlmoda, Hakodate, and Nagasaki;

trade

through Japanese officials at these ports; appoint consuls at
Shimoda and Hakodate; male residence at Nagasaki; limited extra
9
territorial jurisdiction.
On August 21, 1856, the first American Consul-General,
Townsend Harris, arrived in Japan.

Although the Japanese were

at first suspicious of his motives, ho gradually convinced
them of his sincerity and as a result of his patient efforts,
he obtained an additional treaty which was signed on June 20,
1858.

This treaty of amity and commerce provided:

(1)
The exchange of ministers and consuls*
(2)
In addition to Shimoda and Hakodate, the ports
of ilsnagawa (now Yokohama), Nagasaki, Niigata, and Hyogo
were to be open to American ships.
(3) Customs were to be imposed on Imports and exports.

h a u l H. Clyde, the Far East (Englewood Cliffs, S. J.:
Prentice-Ha11, Inc., Third Edition, 1958), p. 191.

10
(11)
Extraterritoriality to b@ recognized for United
States nationals*
(5) Freedom of worship was to b© allowed.
(6) The President of the United States, upon request
of the Japanese, was to act as a mediator between Japan
and European Powers*
(7) The Japanese were entitled to purchase ships and
munitions and engage American naval and other military
personnel, scientists, artisans, mariners, etc., in order
to develop the country*
The treaty was followed by a similiar treaty between Japan and
30
Holland, Great Britain and Franc©•
Trie years from 1859 until the end of th© shogunate in
186? were marked by internal di&sention between th.© daimyo
and the ruling Tokugawa clan.

There were also frequent anti-

foreign outbreaks and in September of 1363, a British subject,
G. 1. Hichardson, was killed near Yokohama.

As a result of

this incident, the British Government demanded a heavy indem
nity, and the trial and execution of th© assassins*

Follow

ing this incident, th© Emperor, on June 25, 1363, ordered th©
expulsion of all foreigners*

On that day, ships and forts be

longing to th© Lord of Chosu opened fire on American trading
ships at anchor near Shimonoseki.

Then followed a series of

similiar attacks on French and Dutch ships which evoked Brit
ish retaliation when they bombed Kagoshima in order to enforce
their demands for th© capture of Hi chard s on1s assassins.

Lat

er in August the British joined th© American, Dutch and French

10Xanaga, op* cit., pp. 26-27; William Elliot Griffis,
Townsend Harris - First American Envoy in Japan (Boston:
Sough'ton,TKi'fjflin ancT Company, 1395), PP* 266-277*

11
ships In an attack against Chosu and by September 8th, all
shore batteries had been silenced through their combined
11
—
efforts.
The following month, the shogun signed a conven
tion in which Japan agreed to pay a ^3,000,000 indemnity to
the foreigners.

In addition, the straits of Shimonoseki were

not to be fortified and it was agreed that they woulu be open
to the commerce of all nations.

12

The Emperor Komai died on February 3$ 1867 and was suc
ceeded by his fourteen year old son, Mutsuhito, who ruled un
der the name of Heu i >

or ”Enlightened Government.”

Soon after

the new reign began, the power of the shogun, who had ruled
Japan for more than 250 years, was broken and destroyed by th©
13
restoration of the imperial power.
Following the restoration of the Emperor, the Japanese
attempted to normalize relations with the Korean Government
and in 1370, and again in 1872, envoys were sent to Seoul to
explain the recent changes in the government.

The Koreans re

pelled any attempt to reestablish friendly relations since
they classified the Japanese In th© same category as the
’’western barbarians.”

Ja pane se -K or e a n relations continued to

deteriorate until 1875$ at which time the two nations became

11

Payson J. Treat, Japan and the United States 18531921 (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1921), pp. 5*4--&6.
12
Yanaga, op. cit., p. 3 2 .
■^Porter, op. cit., p. 109.

12
involved in a brief conflict.

Th© Koreans fired upon a Jap

anese warship, ostensibly on a coastal survey mission, which
had put into the Korean port of Kanghwa for fuel.

Th© Jap

anese easily overcame the coastal defenses and took advantage
of the situation to force a treaty of commerce upon th© Ko
rean Government.

The Treaty of Kanghwa, signed in February

of 1876, provided for the opening of the three ports of Fusan, Jinsen and Sensen, the exchange of Ministers and Consuls
and th© establishment of consular Jurisdiction.

However, It

was not until i860 that the final details governing the open
ing of the ports and th© exchange of Ministers was outlined
and made effective.^
The signing of the Treaty of Kanghwa touched' off a
struggle between th© progressive and conservative factions at
th© Korean court.

Th© progressive faction favored closer re

lations with Japan while th© conservative faction acknowledged
the traditional suzerainty of China over Korea.

In a riot in

Seoul in 1882, the Japanese legation was attacked and several
Japanese were killed; during the fighting, th© Japanese Minis
ter, Mr. Hanabusa, was forced to take refuge aboard a British
ship.

The Japanese immediately dispatched two warships and

an infantry battalion and demanded:

(1)

an official apology

^Tanaga, op. cit., pp, 1C 6-13-7; Treat, Japan and the
United States, pp. 287-288•
-**— —
-

13
for the Incident; (2)

punishment of th© perpetuators; (3)

an

Indemnity to the families of those killed and an indemnity
for the damage to Japanese property.

The affair was settled

by the Treaty of Chemulpo of August 30, 1882.

in addition to

meeting all the demands of the Japanese, th© treaty also pro
vided for the stationing of troops in Korea to protect the
Japanese Legation.

A similiar provision pertaining to the
15
stationing of Chinese troops wa® agreed upon.
The treaty did little to solve th© internal unrest
among the two factions.

On December k» I88I4., followers of

the pro-Japanese faction set fire to the Seoul Post Office,
which was ©bout to be dedicated, and assassinated several
members of the Korean cabinet in attendance at th® ceremonies.
The progressive faction then formed it® own cabinet and
appealed to th© Japanese Minister,
King* for protection.

in th© name of the Korean

At th® asm® time, th© conservative

faction made a similiar appeal to th© Chines© Government.
Troops from both nations clashed on the palace grounds and
bitter feelings developed between the Japanese and Chines©
in Korea.

The Japanese Government dispatched the Minister

of the Imperial Household,

Ito Hirobuai, to negotiate with

the Tientsin Viceroy* LI Hung-chang.

15

The resulting Tientsin

Yanaga, o p . cit.. p. 196; Steiger, o p . c„it .* p. 662.

114Convention, ©Iso known as the Li-Ito* Convention, provided that
th© troops of both nations would be withdrawn from Korea with
in four months and specified that neither nation was to take
part in the training of Korean troops,

in the eventuality

that troops were again needed to put down any grave disturbance,
China and Japan ©greed to consult in writing in advance and,
following the settlement of the matter, to withdraw the troops
l6
«*
without further delay.
Hi© Li-Ito* Convention was only a
temporary solution to the problem of internal Intervention in
Korea and a few years later,

trouble would again break out over

conflicting interests.
Th© Japanese Government had long desired to replace th©
unequal treaties with the foreign governments and, in 1870,
each nation with whom she had a treaty was notified of her
desire for a treaty revision.

Bo Immediate steps were taken,

however, since it was considered more desirable to Institute
domestic reforms and undertake a thorough study of European
and American governmental, financial, industrial and educa
tional institutions.

In 107U* © decision was reached to

create a special bureau for consideration of the treaties
which might be revised.

Two years later, Vic© Minister T©ra

sh im a and Minister Yoshida opened negotiations to this end.

^Ennl s,

o p . c i t ., pp. 277-278; Yansga, o p . c i t ., p. 188.

15
A treaty was finally signed in Washington on July 25, 1878
which restored tariff autonomy to Japan with the provision
that th© other treaty nations must also agree to th© change#
Sine© Great Britain and the other interested nations objec
ted, th© treaty did not take effect#

Following extended nego

tiations, th© British Minister, Mr. F. R* Plunkett, announced
on April 10, I88I4., that unequal treaties would b© abolished
at such time as the Japanese adopted a legal cod® similiar to
that of the western nations.

The Japanese immediately under

took to compile such a code and hired several foreign legal
17
experts to assist them.
On May 1, 1386, Foreign Minister Inou© again reopened
negotiations with the representatives of the foreign powers
for a treaty revision.

An Anglo-German draft was submitted,

setting forth a joint proposal concerning the civil and crim
inal code; th© establishment of courts of consular jurisdic
tion, th© appointment of foreign judges and procurators for
th© trial of foreigners, and th© revision of tariff and import
duties*

18

Th© provision for th© appointment of foreign judi

cial officials became known throughout the nation and a storm
of protests arose*

Foreign Minister Inoue resigned from

l?Yanaga, op. cit., pp. 192-193.
l8Ibid.

16
office and was replaced by Okuma Shigenobu*

Okuma wisely de

cided to negotiate separately with each power and following
th© signing of an equal treaty with Mexico on November 30,
1888, similiar treaties were obtained with Great Britain,
(1894)I United States, (1894); Italy, (1894)> Germany, (1895)$
Bussia, (1895)$ and France, (1896)*
ties provided for:

In general, these trea

equal treatment in travel and trade;

acceptance of a most favored nation clause; abolition of
alien land ownership rights after th® expiration of the lease;
a new tariff ad valorem r a t ® * ^

By these treaty revisions,

Japan obtained political and economic ©quality with th© West,
In 1094# & Korean dissident sect called th© Tong
Hades, precipitated a war which served to demonstrate Japan’s
military strength to the West and at th© sara© time, the in
ternal weakness of China*

The Tong Haks were founded in 1850

with th© object of combining th© better elements of Taoism,
Buddhism and Confucianism*

However, they had developed into

a chauvinistic, anti-Japanese military group*

As a result of

repeated riots for which they were responsible, the Korean
King called upon the Chinese for troops to quell the disorder*
The Chinese dispatched 1,500 troops and then notified th©
Japanese, under the terras of the LI -I to Convention, that th©

19yanaga, op* cit*, pp. 194-197.

17
troops would be withdrawn following the settlement of the
disturbances.

The Japanese thereupon sent $,000 troops to

protect the Ip,000 Japanese residents in Korea and establish
ed a headquarters at Chemulpo.

The Korean King asked the

Chinese troops to leave but they declined to withdraw until
after the Japanese left.

The Japanese, in turn, declined to

leave until the Chinese gave guarantees that they would carry
20
out the terms of the Li-Ito Convention.
On July 25, IS9k» the Chinese fired upon three Japan
ese warships enroute to Korea; the Japanese retaliated, sink
ing one Chinese troop transport and capturing another.

A few

days later on August 1st, Nippon declared war upon China and
immediately began a vigorous military campaign.

A month lat

er, the Japanese Fleet under Admiral Ito, captured the Chinese
Fleet in a battle fought in the Yellow Sea anu the Nipponese
demonstrated their naval superiority for the duration of the
war.

In rapid succession, Nipponese ground forces captured the

Chinese strongholds In Korea and Invaded Manchuria, the Liao
tung and Shantung peninsulas, capturing Dairen, Port Arthur
and Chinchow.

. J,a p a n

s o u t h oi

Other forces captured the Pescadores Islands
prope r.

21

20snnis, c>jD. cit., p. 278; Porter, op. cit., pp. 132-13 3 .
21
133-138.

Yanaga, op. cit., pp. 2lpLj_-2kg; Porter, op. cit., pp.
--"
— "*
—
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the Qhlm-ae unsuoc m ®fully aought the Intervention of
Ore at Britain and Hus j©la to and the war.

VIoeroy Li tamn

attested to negotiate peace bcru$ through a Oertmn named
Detring who was employed in the Chines® Customs* Service*

The

Japanese* refused to deal with anyone other fc;mn a nigh rank*
ii%£ Chinese official with full powers to negotiate a peace*
I,i was therefore dispatched to Japan to discuss a peace set
tlement.

Cn March 23$ 189$# four d&yc after hie arrival at

Shtmomaeki# a Japanese made is attempt on Ll*s l.lf©.

This

I m W e n t great It embarrassed th© Japanese Oovernment and also
tended to weaken th© Tokyo Government's position*

&evertU*"»

less » on March 30* IS95# 11 agreed to immediate surrender and
on April 17th* signed the Treaty of shiaonoaekl* ***~
Hornbaek aptly su^ a r i s s d China*s humiliating defeat

when ho wrote 5
Tao ar cst# the older 1, the most populous o .✓. try
in the <* .**1 i# a huge e >rtinental empire long ao^ *toned
to astea.n Itself the ©ole repos itory of national
strength 4auJ aubet&nse was defeated in war and invaded
by the arseJ force© of a little insular neighbor**^
Dy the terns of the treaty* China agreed to recognise
the Independence of Korea j to cede to Japan the Liaotung penin
sula * Formosa and the Feecadorea; to pay an Indemnity of

fc4UYanaga, m * M i * * PP* £i|.5-146.
^Hornback, 0£# c i t * » p* vll*

200,000,003 taels; to open .four new treaty ports to Japanese
trade and residence; to cone lade a new treaty of c a u w c a ,
ij

granting to Japan the status of a most-favored-nati on.w
The other Western nations were both surprised and alarm
ed at Japan1s success against what had been thought of as a
mighty nation*

Russia,

joined by .France and Germany made a

demand that Japan retrocede the Liaotung Peninsula to China
on the grounds that such a position would threaten China and
Korea and disturb the peace of the Far East*

The Japanese,

rather than face war or lose any other benefits, yielded to the
demands of the three nations on Hay 5, 1895 and four days lat
er, th© ratification of the treaty took place*

The Japanese

were particularly embittered by the intervention and would long
remember this in future wars with Russia and Germany*

The

Western Powers In turn, saw China*a defeat as a golden opportun
ity to press for concessions in a vast land heretofore consider2p
ed a “sleeping dragon” that should not be disturbed*
After expelling the 0hine.se from Korea, the Japanese
soon learned that they would now have to deal with Russia*

By

the terms of a Convention signed on May 13, I896, both Russia and

^Steiger, op* cit*, pp. 626-627; Clyde, op. cit., p. 302*
2<
^Treat, Japan and the United States, pp* 133-139;
Yanaga, o£* cit*, pp. 1357f,252,

Japan gained the right to station 800 troops each in Seoul as
a legation guard force.

A year later, Russian 'military and

financial advisors were attached to the Korean Court.

In

order to counterbalance the growth of Russian influence, the
Nipponese secured the right to guard the Japanese-built tele
graph lines between Pusan and Seoul; this was followed by
permission to build a railroad between these two cities.
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On April 25, 1898, the Nlahi-Rosen Protocol, while reassert
ing the independence of Korea, pledged both Russia and Japan
not to take any action concerning the nomination of financial
and military advisors to the Korean Court without a prior
mutual agreement.

‘Russia also recognized the right of Japan

to develop industrial and commercial relationships with
Karoa.~ ^
China did not obtain the intervention of the European
Powers on her behalf without cost.

Shortly after the end of

the Slno-Japanese 'War, Prance secured a revision in her favor
of the Sino-Annamesa frontier and ratification of a FrancoChinesa boundary convention.

Franc© ana Russia also made a

par cent loan to China in order that th© latter might pay
her war indemnity to Japan.

Russia obtained an important

21
concession when she was given the right to build the Chinese
Eastern Raiiroad as a connecting link to the Trans-Siberian
Railroad.

By the terms of the Li-Lobanov Treaty, the Russians

virtually gained control over the entire railroad zone extend23
ing across northern Manchuria,
Germany, without success, tried to gain the cession of
a Chinese port by diplomatic means.

Her opportunity to make a

demand for territory came following the murder of a German
priest in 1897*

In a treaty signed on March 6, 1393, Germany

was granted a ninety-nine year lease to the port city of
Tslngtao and two hundred square miles of territory surrounding
the Kiaoehow Bay,*^ A few weeks later, on March 27th, China
granted to Russia a twenty-five year lease of Port Arthur to
gether with 1,300 square miles of land with the right to build
a railroad connection from Port Arthur to the Chinese Eastern
and Trans-Siberian RaiIroad
The United States became concerned over these scrambles
for territory in China and on

September 6,1899,Secretary

Hay

sent

his 15open door!t notes to Great Britain,Germany

sia;

these were followed by similiar notes to Japan, Italy,

Clyde, o£. oit., pp.
*"^Treat, The Far £ast,
3 % b i d . , p. 329.

310-311.
pp. 326-328,

andRus

and franco»

The notes asked for equal commercial opportunity

within the various apharos of influence in China.
plies to the notos wore guarded and vague;

The re

Russia rejected

the proposal while Great Britain conditioned her acceptance
on simtllar assent by the other powers.

Actually little was

gained by the notes since Washington was not willing to sup31
port her diplomacy with military action.
This steady Influx of foreigners into China led to an
increasing number of ant I.-foreign outbreaks.

A Chines©

nationalist group, known as the I Ho Ohuan or 11Plata of Right
eous Harmony,*1 called nBoxersw by the Europeans, Instigated
a series of attacks on trio foreign settlements and the proWestern Chinese OhrIstIans•

T m j gained several initial suc

cesses and received the support of the Dowager Empress, who
issued the following proclamation:
I command that all f >reignars, men, women and
children, old and young, be summarily executed.
Let
no on© escape so that my Empire may be purged of
thin noisome- source of oorruption^$nd that peace may
bo restored to my loyal subjects .3^'
In June of 1900, the Boxers attacked the foreign legations in
Poking and only the joint intervention of dapanes©, European
and American troops prevented the annllhation of the dlplo-

^Griswold, op. oit., pp. 74-36.
3^J. 0. P. Bland and L. Deckhouse, China Under the Lmprasa Dowager Tzu Shi (London: William no I n© man n,''Ypl 3T,’ p. 2

mat!c personnel*
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The Boxer uprisings provided Russia with the excuse
for extending military control throughout Manchuria*

Follow

ing the agreement of the Boxer Protocol of September 7# 1901
by which China agreed to pay heavy indemnities to the nations
whose nationals had been attacked by the rioters, Russia at
tempted to conclude a separate military agreement with Peking
that would confirm her new control of Manchuria*

Only after

the strong intervention of the other treaty powers was Russia
finally forced, on April 8, 1902, to agree to evacuate Man-

CHAPTER III
PRELUDE TO THE MAR
On January 30, 1902, Nippon signed a treaty of alliance
with Great Britain,

This alliance was destined to have a

marked effect upon the foreign relations of Japan for the fol
lowing twenty years.

There was no precedent In Nipponese for

eign relations for such an alliance and the cabinet ministers
and political advisors to the Emperor were divided in opinion
as to whether Japan should undertake such an alliance or to
1
attempt to reach an understanding with Russia.
Both the Tokyo
Government and Great Britain were afraid that Russian advances
in Manchuria, If allowed to continue unchecked, would threaten
?
their interests in North China and the Yangtze Talley.
On
the other hand, Marquis Ito and Marquis Inouye, both elder
statesmen of considerable Influence, felt that a direct rap
prochement with Russia would be a more practicable solution
and they were not fully sympathetic to the idea of an arrange3
ment with the British.
The negotiations leading to the alliance were prompted

^Ishii Kikujiro, Diplomatic Commentaries {Baltimores
Johns Hopkins University fress,'
'1^3o), pp. 35> ^ 9 .
2Yanaga, op, cit., p. 295*
3ishii, op. cit., p. 2*3 ,
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by a visit of the Gorman Charge <31affaires, Baron von Edkhardstein, to th© Japanese Minister at London, Hayashi Tadasu.
The Gorman diplomat suggested that his country, Japan and Eng
land join together in an alliance for the purpose of maintain
ing the balance of power in the Far East.

The alliance was to

be th© Far Eastern counterpart of the Triple Alliance, giving
Japan a free hand in Korea.

In the ©vent of a war involving

on© of th© parties, the other parties would remain neutral un
less a third party came to the assistance of th© enemy at
which time the remaining two allied nations would intervene
The Tokyo Government decided to explore the possibil
ity of undertaking such an alliance and at the same time sound
out St. Petersburg on reaching an acceptable agreement.

Haya

shi conferred with the British F'oreign Secretary, Lord Landsdowne, on April 17th, 1901, and was encouraged to think that
a British alliance might be secured.

Actual negotiations,

however, did not officially commence until the following Getorf
be t S
Marquis Ito, with the approval of the Japanese Govern
ment, visited Russia in a private capacity in November of 1901,
in an attempt to negotiate an understanding.

Ito first visit

ed the United States where he received an honorary degree

^Ishii, pp. cit., p. 37; Yanaga, o p . cit., p. 293.
g
^Yanaga,

ojd.

cit.. p. 300.

from Yale University on the occasion of its bicentennial cel
ebration in October of 1901*

The elder statesman then con

tinued on to Paris where he briefly talked with Minister
Hayashi who showed him a draft of a proposed alliance treaty
submitted by the British Government.

From Paris, Ito

went on

to St. Petersburg where he conferred with the Tsar, Foreign
Minister Lamsdorff and Finance Minister Witte*

During tne

discussions the Japanese leader made the following proposals
as a basis for an understanding between Japan and Russia:
(!) A reciprocal guarantee of the independence
of Korea*
(2) A reciprocal guarantee not to use any part of
Korea for strategic purposes nor to take military
measures along the Korean coast which would hamper
freedom of passage'through the straits.
(3) Russia to recognize Japan’s freedom of action
in political, commercial and Industrial matters in
Korea*
Japan would also have the exclusive right to
assist the Korean Government in Its internal operation
and if necessary, to dispatch troops.
The Russians, however, were unwilling to agree to such terms
and Ito left for Berlin where he awaited the completion of
the Anglo-Japanese negotiati ons,7 The British, in the mean
while, learned of Ito’s visit to Russia and decided to speed
up their negotiations in order to forestall any agreement be
tween Japan and Russia,

The British and Japanese by now had

agreed not to invite Germany to participate in the alliance

2?
talks due to the growing hostility of the British people to
ward Germany.

Furthermore, Japan had no real basis for reach

ing an understanding with Germany.

Marquis I to had given up

his hopes of an agreement with Russia and on December lij.th, he
wired his consent to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance to the For
eign Ministry.

Th© Emperor gave his approval after receiving

a favorable report from th© Privy Council and th© document
was signed for their respective governments by Lord Landsdown©
3
and Mr. Hayashi on January 30, 1902.
Th® new treaty provided that the two nations would "up
hold the status quo and general peace In the extreme East.11
Th© two nations pledged themselves to support the "independence
and Integrity of the Empire of China and Korea," and promised
to maintain "equality of opportunity for commerce and industry
of all nations."

Perhaps more Important were the defensive

arrangements which provided that if either Japan or Great Brit
an, in defense of its Interests, became involved in war with
another power, the other party would remain neutral.

However,

if a fourth or other po\*ers joined in the hostilities, both
parties to th© Alliance pledged themselves to make war in
9
common.
On April 8, 1902, Russia and China signed a convention

^Isliii, op. cit., pp.

1 fanaga, op. cit., p. 301.

^Ishii, op. clt., pp. 328— 329*
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by which Russia agreed to w.tthdraw from Manchuria,

Three

zones within Manchuria were defined and th© withdrawal was
to be staged over three six-month periods with the entire
evacuation scheduled to be completed not later than October
3, 1903*

10

The first step in the evacuation was completed as

scheduled but th© withdrawn troops were merely relocated in
the second 2one or at Port Arthur.

During the second evacua

tion period, th© troops were moved to the Korean border where
Russia had forestry concessions along the Yalu River area,
further pretense of evacuation was halted by Russia on April
18, 1903 and demands were mad© upon China for concessions
which, if granted, would establish a virtual Russian protectorate over all Manchuria and Mongolia*

11

The Japanese became alarmed when Russia failed to evac
uate Manchuria as provided in th© agreement of April 8th and,
at a meeting held before the throne on Jun.© 23, 1903, it was
decided to approach Russia regarding the matter.

On August

12, 1903, Ambassador Kuri.no delivered a note to Mr, Lamsdorff
in which the following proposals were made:
(1)
Mutual engagement to respect the independence
and territorial integrity of the Chinese and Korean

10

Manehurlan Treaties and Agreements (Washingtons Carne
gie Endowment f or'Tniernati orial Peace, 1921), pp. 65-63,
1XT:c-eat, The Par East, p. 366,
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-Empires and to maintain the principles of equal oppor
tunity for the commerce and industry of all nations in
these c o m tries*
{2) Reciprocal recognition of Japan1a preponderating
interests in Korea and Russia*s special interests in
railway enterprises in Manchuria, and of the right of
Japan to take in Korea and of Russia to take in nanohu
rl a such measures as may be necessary for the protection
of their respective Interests as above defined, subject,
however, to the provisions of Article 1 of this Agreement*
(3)
Reciprocal undertaking on the part of Russia and
Japan not to impede development of those industrial and
commercial activities of Japan in Korea and of Russia in
Manchuria, which are not inconsistent with the stipula
tions of Article 1 of this Agreement*
Additional engagement on the part of Russia not to
impede the eventual extension of the Korean Railway into
Southern Manchuria so as to connect with the East China
and Shanhaikwan-Newchwang lines*
(L;) Reciprocal engagement that in case it is found
necessary to send troops by Japan to Korea, or by Russia
to Manchuria, for hie purpose either of protecting the
interests mentioned in Article 2 of this Agreement, or
of suppressing insurrection or disorder calculated to
create international complications, the troops so sent
are to be forthwith recalled as soon as their missions
are accomplished*
(5) Recognition on the part of Russia of the exclu
sive right of Japan to give advice and assistance includirig necessary mi 1i iary assistance *
(6) This Agreement to supplant all previous arrange
ments between Japan and Russia respectin'-: Korea.
Russia countered with a series of delaying tactics and
did not make a reply to the note until October 3rd, by which
time she announced that the subject of China and Manchuria
were removed from the discussions*

On October 30th, the Jap

anese then submitted a counter proposal insisting upon China

12,

ihe Far hast, pp. 3&9~3?0*

being included in the negotiations•

In subsequent proposals,

Japan agreed that Manchuria was outside of her sphere of in
terests provided that Russia respected the Integrity of China
and Korea#

When a reply was not received to the note dated

January 13* 19014., the Japanese became convinced that further
negotiations were useless and it was decided to terminate the
negotiations and sever diplomatic relations--a step that ulti
ll
rnstely led to war*
The first hostilities in the Russo-Japanese War took
place on February 8, 19Qq when a fleet of ten Japanese destroy
ers suddenly attacked Russian ships anchored near Port Arthur*
The following day, th© Japanese engaged a. Russian cruiser and
gunboat outside the harbor of Chemulpo in Korea and success
fully put them both out of action*

The port was then employed

for the debarkation of Japanese troops on the mainland*

Two

days later, on February 10th, Tokyo officially declared war on
Russia.
The Japanese gained military superiority from the very
outset of the war and easily overran Korea*

On February 23rd,

about 350,000 Russian troops faced 1^00,000 Japanese along a

11

Takouchi T a t s u j l , War and Diplomacy in bhe Japanese
ihapire (hew York:
Doubleday, Doran and Co*, 19351, pp.' 157Tlil; Treat, Ja p a n and th© Uni tad States, p, l30; Treat, The
F a r hast, p P7 “37I-I72.“
—
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front of over I4.0 miles, near the city of Mukden*

After two

weeks of incessant fighting and th© combined less of over
130,000 casualties, the Japanese occupied Mukden and forced
id
the Russians to withdraw to Harbin*
Port Arthur surrendered
on January 2, 1905 after a siege of several months during which
Japanese losses were extremely heavy*

By hay, the Russians

suffered further defeats at the lain River, Kincliau and N&ushan*

The coup de grace was administered when the Russian

Baltic Fleet, ©nrout© to Vladivostok, wan defeated on May 28th
by Admiral Togo while passing through the Tsushima Straits.
The Russians lost six battleships, six cruisers, five destroy
ers and five other ships*

Throe ships were captured and three

others managed to escape.

Nearly 12,000 Russian sailors went
16
down with thoir ships in this historic naval battle*
Early in 1905, with both nations showing signs of war
weariness, the, first steps had been taken to bring th© fighting
to an end.

Premier Delo&ss^f of France offered to mediate in

peace talks between the two belligerents and at tho same time,
Cecil Spring-Rica, Councillor to the British Embassy at Saint
Petersburg, was invited to present his views in Washington on
Russian conditions.

15

_

Both the Japanese and Russian Governments

j. P. 0. Puller, Mill tary Hi ctory of tho We 3tern.
World (New York: Punk and Wagnails* C o .,195-7) 9 III. pp. ~lh2~
X 63 #
io
'Puller, op* cit** p. 1651 Yanaga, op* cit*, pp. 303-309
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asked the United States to intercede and on June 0, 1905» iden
tical notes were dispatched to the two governments formally in17
vitimr then to participate in a peace conference,
A few mo at hs p ri ox* t a the pe see- t* Ik invitat ions , the
British Government negotiated the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese
Alliance.

Both nations were confident of the ultimate victory

of the Kipponese in the war and Great Britain desired to pre
vent any possible rapproe he me n t at'the end of the struggle be
tween Hues is. and Japan.

Under the terms of the renewal, Japan

recognized Great Britain* s special interests * In all that con
cerns the security of the Indian Frontier,” as a quid pro quo
for British recognition of Japan’s "paramount political, mili
tary and economic interesta" in Korea.

The terms of the origin

al alliance were also modified to provide that either party of
the alliance would coma to the aid of the other if attacked by
a third party.

It was further agreed that the attack or threat

of attack need not origin*is In the Par East.

The treaty was

signed on August 12th and published on September 27, 1305,
10
prior to the conclusion of the Treaty of Portsmouth.
While
the Japanese considered the revised treaty as symbolic of a new
concept of mutual defense of territorial rights, the Russian

17
18

Ennis, o p . cit., p. 288; Y&naga, o p . cit., p. 310.

G. P. Gooch and Harold Temper ley, {e d . British
Documents on the Origins of the W a r , 1093-191U (London:
H.M.
Stationery 0ffice~'~r1929), IV, pp. 161^-165*
(Hereafter cited
as British .Documents).
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Government considered the treaty as being directed against
its position, in the iPar hast#

19

The peace negotiations commenced at a conference held
in Portsmouth, Hew Hampshire 0:1 August 10, 1905*
Theodore Roosevelt took a leading role,
enjoyed},

President

(which he obviously

in conducting the day-to-day negotiations and in

the drafting of the treaty*

The two enemy nations came to

an impasse over th® issue of payment of an indemnity by Rus
sia to Japan*

President Roosevelt, unknown to the Nipponese,

learned that th© Russians might be willing to give Japan the
southern half of Sakhalin in lieu of a money indemnity.

The

President cajoled the Japanese into accepting this proposal
and th© treaty was signed on September

1905•

In addition

to ceding the southern half of Sakhalin to Japan, Russia ac
knowledged the Tokyo Governmentfs paramount political, mili
tary and economic interests in Korea and agreed not to inter
vene in the measures of control and guidance taken in that
country.

Manchuria was to be returned to Chinese control ex

cept that the leasehold on the Liaotung Peninsula, together
with the ownership of the South Manchurian Railway and control
over the railroad zone, was to be transferred to Japan subject

19

Ishll, op. ci t., p. Sh» British Documents, IV, p. 203*

314to tno consent of the Gninese Government.
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The terms of the

peace treaty, while agreed to by th© Imperial Government of
Japan, were not readily accepted by the Japanese people who
felt that Russia should have been required to pay an Indemni
ty.

Severe riots broke out in several Japanese cities and it

was soma time before the people were quiet aga in.

21

Following the ratification of the Treaty of Portsmouth,
Baron Komira was dispatched to Peking where e new treaty ef
fecting the transfer of the Russian leasehold in llano hurl a to
Japan was signed.

Nippon now gained an undisputed foothold on

the mainland of Asia and virtually a carte blanche to absorb
2.2
Korea within her growing Empire.
Following the Russo-Japanese war, France sought to bet
ter her relations with Japan.

Her extensive holdings in

French Indo-Ohina made such action necessary as she was afraid
of Japanese retaliation for her permitting Russian naval ves
sels to use supply facilities in Madagascar and at Camranh
during the war,

A Franco-Japanese agreement was signed on

£0
*" Siting E. Horison (ed.), The Letters of Theodore
Roosevelt (Cambridge: Harvard University fr'ess, 1'bpXy, '"fv, pp.
XyoT-XJSJ; Xshii, on. oit., pp. 65-69; Harley F, Mackair and
Donalc F. Each, Mo de rn H ^ a r hast Internal lon&l R e lations (Hew
York:
D, Van Hostrund Co. , i55077~~P* 153*
21
■“Is hi I, on. cit., pp. 69-70.
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June 10, 190?,

After th© traditional acknowledgements of the

Independence of China, the signatories announced that they
would support each other in maintaining ”peace and security
in those regions with a view to maintaining the respective

Although the spheres of interests were
not delimited, the provinces of Kw&ntung, Kwangoi and Yunnan

hien Province, Manchuria and Mongolia.
The French treaty was followed by a far more Important
entente with. Hassle.

On July 30, 1907, the two nations agreed

to recognize the integrity of China and "the principle of
equal opportunity in whatever concerns the couimerc© and indus
try of all nations in that empire, and engage to sustain and
defend the maintenance of th® status quo and respect for this
principle by all pacific means within their r e a c h . I n

an

additional secret convention, the two powers established in
Manchuria a line running north and south over wnich. each
would not; encroach.

Russia recognized Japan* s interests in

Korea while Hippon gave similiar assurances to Russia’s

2^
«
With and C oneerrilny
one grain,
versity Press,
Press, 1921
19u
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interests In Outer Mongolia.

26

In an effort to ease growing tensions between the Unit
ed States and Japan, Secretary of State Blihu Root and Ambas
sador Takahira exchanged notes on November 30, 1908, which
aet forth their joint policy in the Par Past,

The two govern

ments promised the maintenance of the atatus quo in the Far
East and each agreed to respect the territorial rights of the
other and support the ”independence and integrity of China*”
Actually, Japan interpreted the Root-Takahira notes as tanta
mount to American acceptance of her treaties with France,
Russia and England and the recognition and acceptance of her
27
special position. In China and Korea.
In August of 1910, Japan formally annexed Korea.

The

first step in this direction was taken in 1905 when the To
kyo Government announced the establishment of a protectorate
over Korea.

Two years later, th© Korean King dispatched a

secret mission to the Second Hague Conference in an attempt
to gain the freedom of his country.

His efforts were

unsuc

cessful and as a result, he was forced to abdicate in favor
of his son.

The Nipponese thereupon initiated complete

26Merebith E* Cameron, Georg© E* MeReynolds and Thomas
H* D. Mahoney, China, Japan and the Powers (New York:
Th©
Ronald Press, 19525> F* 555.
^^Treaties and Agreements With and Concerning China,
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control over Internal as well &e foreign relation®.

The Ko

rean people quite naturally resented the presence of the
Japanese in their country and scti.vcly opposed the program
of th© Japanese Resident General In Korea, Prince Ito#

When

he was assassinated on October 26, 1909 at Harbin by a Ko
rean fanatic, the Japanese public clamored for annexation of
Korea*

,4c the Tokyo Government had already gained wide rec

ognition of her special position In Korea, the annexeti on
pa
was carried out with little difficulty on August 22, 1Q10*
Tho Anglo-Japan©s© Alliance was renewed for the last
time on July 13, 1911*

Actually, the alliance m s

as popular as a decade before*

no longer

Strong anti-Japanese senti

ments bad developed among the people of the British Domin
ions and even In. England.

In Japan too, there had been a

change In attitude, touched off by the British criticism of
Nippon’s policy in China,

Havertholes*, th# leaders of both

governments fait that the continuation of th© alliance would
serve to check against both Germany and Russia*

The British

Got,eraaic-nt, however, found 5.tself In a delicate position in
that by the terms of the alliance, she was obligated to aid
Tokyo In th© ©vent of a war between Japan and th© united

^ E e n r y Chung, Korean Trestles (Hew Yortet H* S,
Michols, Inc., 1919), i>p• ^S^SSS'jTTS'tone th Scott La tour© t to,
A Short History of the Far Fast (Mew York: Th® Macmillan Co. ,
T 9 J ^ P ? T 5 i S t 5 I 5 | T i w , - ^ r cit., pp. 3U3-3U5.
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States.

This issue was neatly solved by the addition of a

saving clause which read?
Article IV* Should wither High Contracting Party
conclude a treaty of general arbitration with a
third Power, It is agreed that nothing in this Agree
ment shall entail upon such Contracting Party an ob
ligation to go to war with the Powgr with whom such
treaty of arbitration Is In force*2^
The revised agreement also omitted any further refer
ences to Korea, Britain’s Indian Frontier, or th© RussoJapanese War| otherwise it was substantially the same as the
previous agreement signed in 1905?*
On July if., 1910, Russia and Japan signed a convention
by which they agreed to eliminate the competition between
their railroad lines In Manchuria.

Each agreed to maintain

the political and economic status quo In Manchuria and con
sult with each other in the event the status quo was threat30
©ned.
Two years later, in March of 1912, both Tokyo and St.
Petersburg business interests were invited to join a FourPower group of American, French, German and English bankers
in forraing a syndicate to arrange a loan of 10 million pounds
to China.

The loan would be used for currency reform and

^Ishil,

ojd.

cit., pp.

333.

-^Treaties and Agreements With and Concerning China.
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the Industrial development of the Three Eastern Provinces In
Manchuria#

The other Powers had originally excluded Japan

and Russia and only admitted them to the Con sort!-urn after
31
the two nations made strong objections to China*
The two
former enemy nations drew closer together following their
united stand against the Four-Power Consortium and on July 8,
1912, Japan and Russia signed a treaty at St* Petersburg con
firming the provisions of the secret conventions of 1907 and

.

1910 32
In summary, during the decade from 1902 to 1912, Kippon
gained important concessions and alliances which demonstrated
her leading position in the Far East*

Th© Anglo-Japanese Alli

ance secured her against encroachments by Russia and Germany
and provided a powerful ally In Great Britain, whom she would
later be called upon to aid during World War 1*

The defeat of

Russia in 1905 demonstrated Japan1s military might and assist
ed her In obtaining legal recognition of har demand for con
cessions In Manchuria and elsewhere on the mainland of Asia*
The several agreements with European Powers, plus the RootTakahira Notes of 1908 provided Japan with implied recognition

•^Clyde, op* cl t *, pp*
■^Ernest Batson Price, The Busao-Japan©ae Treaties of
1907-1916 Concerning Manchuria and Mongolia (Baltlmorel “tE@
cToIinsT o p kins Press 7 I93JJ7 P P # T 7 - 9 6

ko

of her special position in Korea which she ultimately incor
porated Into the Japanese Empire in 1910*

Finally, the unit

ed stand of Russia and japan against th© Four Power Consor
tium demonstrated a new closeness of relations between these
two nations which served as a warning to the West that neither
Russia nor Japan intended to relinquish control over Manchuria
and Mongolia to outside powers*

CHAPTER IV
SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS AMD THE WAR YEARS
There were no major problems In international relations between China and Japan during the first half of the
nineteenth century*

Indeed, China's policy towards all for

eign nations was marked by the principle of _i shih t 1ung Jen,
or lsto treat all with the same kindness.

The opening

of Japan and the growth of Western influence in China however,
worked changes*

These were demonstrated by China's defeat in

the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895* after which China faced
a constant demand for concessions from both the European Pow2
©rs and ner neighbor, Japan.
A decree on February 12, 1912, signed by the Dowager
Empress Lung Yu, in her capacity as Regent, abolished the
Mancha rule in favor of a republican form of government.

The

entire country had been seething in revolt for over a year
and although the Manehu leaders had mad® belated attempts at
reform, the old order failed to reestablish popular confidence.
The Japanese Government at first sided with the monarchy and
hoped for a joint A n g 1 o-Js.panese intervention under the

^Shuhsi Hsu, An Introduction to S 1no-Foreign Relations
{Shanghai:
Kelly and Walsh, Limited, I 9 4 I), "p." 37.'

(^
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Alliance with London*

The British, however, were reluc

tant to take action against tne revolutionary elements as
they controlled the Yangtze area where English interests were
extensive.

The revolutionary leader, Sun Yat Sen, was elected

President of trie Chinese Provisional Government but proved
unable to maintain control and was forced to flee to Japan.
Yuan Shih-kai, the head of the conservative and constitution
alist element, succeeded Sun fat Sen and became President of
3
China.
The first years of the new republic were marked by
confusion and disunity which played directly into the hands
of the Japanese and Western Powers seeking to extend and
strengthen their growing economic footholds
As World War I began, on August

191*4-# the French

Minister to Japan proposed that Nippon and France conclude a
treaty of alliance.

The proposal was later amended to pro

vide for France to become a member of the Anglo-Japanese Alli
ance.

Membership in the Alliance was desired by the Paris

Government in order to safeguard interests in French Indo-China*

A week later, Russia made a similiar overture .for parti

cipation in a tripartite alliance,

neither Sir Edward Grey

nor Foreign Minister Rato wanted tne two other nations to join

iinruLS , op. cit., p. 1 kg..
t,
‘'hlsu, China and her Political Entity, pp. 3^3-349*
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the Alliance since it would serve to dilute its effectiveness.
As an alternative to these proposals, Japan was invited to
adhere to the Declaration of London of September 4? 1914•
This was accomplished in October of 1915 when Japan, along
with the other parties to the declaration, agreed not to make
a separate peace and to consult with the other parties on all
peace proposals
The British Ambassador at Tokyo, Sir C« Greene, advised
th© Japanese Government on August 3rd that Britain would rely
upon her help in the event the British concessions at Hong
Kong and he!-hai-wei were threatened*
replied that it would

The Japanese Government

consider such an attack as sufficient

basis to invoke action under the Anglo-*Japanese Alliance*

6

Sir Edward Grey then dispatched a message in which he thanked
the Japanese Government for their offer of assistance and ex
pressed the hope that Nippon1a involvement in tho war would
7
not be necessary*
However, after war was declared, the Brit
ish attitude underwent a change*

The British plan called for

the seizure of the German wireless stations in New Guinea, Yap
and Nauru by the 'Australian Navy*

The Australian Government

g
"ishii, op# cit*, pp* 101-103; Yanaga, op* cit* B p. 356.
^British Documents, XI, p. 293*
'’ibid., p. 329.

now felt that the Gentian Pacific Fleet, under Admiral von
Spee should be destroyed prior to any attack on the German
island possessions.

The British and Dominion Naval Forces

could not undertake such an operation without additional ships
and on August ?th, the British Government formally asked Japan
to "hunt out and destroy the armed German merchant cruisers."
The request went on to say, "this of course means an act of
war against Germany, but this is, in our opinion, unavoidable.”
Prior to the outbreak of hostilities, the Japanese pub
lic had shown but little interest in tho affairs of Europe,
However, the newspapers throughout the nation now took up the
war cause and reminded the Japanese people of the part Ger
many played in the Triple Intervention of 1895; of Nippon’s
obligations under the Anglo-Japanese Alliance; and of 3@rmany’s threat to neutral shipping in th© Far East.
courses were now open, to Japan, namely,
to join the Central Powers,

9

Three

to remain neutral,

or to join the Allies.

While

some of the Elder Statesmen felt that Germany might possibly
win th© war. Baron Kato made 'a strong plea for participation
in the conflict as a token of Japan* s friendship for England.

The cabinet, on August 8 th, decided to enter the war and to
demand not only th© surrender of German ships in the Pacific
10
waters, but also th® surrender of the Kiaochow leasehold.
Actually, the Tokyo Government did not feel that it had a
legal obligation to enter the war under the t erms of the Alii
ance, nevertheless, it welcomed the "opportunity to destroy
the German influence from Eastern. Asia and to enhance the
prestige of Japan.u

11

The British Government feared that

the Inclusion of Kiaochow in the Japanese military action
would involve China and perhaps effect England’s commercial
interests In her concession areas.

bond on therefore asked

Tokyo, on August 11th, to postpone all military action and
1P
withdrew Its request for assistance.
The Japanese Govern
ment replied that war had already been decided upon and that
there was a general widespread popular demand for revenge
against Germany.

The reply went on to say that Japan did not

harbor any territorial ambitions nor would its entry into the
13
war effect British tra.de*
Grey now reversed, his previous
stand and on August 13th, be agreed to a Japanese ultimatum

k-G

to Germany for the surrender of armed vessels and the ICiaoehow leasehold but asked Nippon to confine herself 11to the
German Base and neighboring Chinese seas.11^

Two days later,

the Japanese Government Issued an ultimatum to the German Gov
ernment using phraseology slmiliar to that used by Germany
in 1095 when she demanded that Japan renounce her claim to the
Liaotung Peninsula:
(1) To withdraw immediately from the Japanese and
Chinese waters German men-of-war and armed vessels of
all kinds and to disarm at one© those that cannot be
so withdrawn,
(2) To deliver on a date not later than September
15# 1911i* to the Imperial Japanese authorities without
condition or compensation the entire leased territory
of Kiaochow, with a^view to eventual restoration of
the same to C h i n a , ^
The German Government was given until noon on August
23rd to signify her acceptance of the terms, otherwise, the
Japanese Government would be free to take such action as it
16
deemed necessary to meet the situation*
In the meantime,
in an effort to limit Japan*s role, the British Government
issued the following statement;
The Governments of Great Britain and Japan having
been In communication with each other are of opinion
that it is necessary for each to take action to

^■MacNair and Lach, op* cit*, p* 177•
1■^Ldwin A, Falk, From ferry to Pearl JIarbor (New York;
Doubleday, Doran and Oo.l 19kJ)> P •"""^iB’; Mactair'and Lach,
op* cit*, p. 1 7 8.
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~?MacNair and Lach, op* pit*, p, 179.
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p r ot ec t the general interests in the Far East c o n t e m 
p l a t e d by the Anglo -J a pa ne se .Alliance . . . It is u n 
de rs to od that the a c t i o n of Japan will not e xt en d to
the Pacific Oc e a n b e y o n d the C h i n a Seas, exc e pt in so
f a r as It may be n e c e s s a r y to protect Japanese s h i p 
p ing lanes in the Pacific, nox- beyond Asiatic waters
w e s t w a r d of the Chins Seas, nor to any f o re ig n terri
tory except territory in
occupation on the
cont in en t of ea s t e r n Asia
*
In an effo rt
Premier Ckuma

to allay suspicion of Japan's motives,

issued the following public statements

. * * Japan has no u l t e ri o r motive, no desire to
secure more territory, no thought of depriving China
or other people of an yt hi ng w h i c h they now possess.
The Government and my people have given their word
and their pledge w hi ch will be hono re d end kept as
J apan always keeps promises
Up on learning of Japan's preparations

to enter

China mad© a. last minute at tempt

to cede

at Tsingtao to the United States

for immediate

to China.

However,

the G e r m a n lease ho ld

Un i t e d States

transfer ba ck

S ec re ta ry Lansing r e pl ie d to this s u g g e s 

tion that "it w o u l d be q ui x o t i c In the extreme
q u e s t i o n of China*s

the war,

territorial integrity

to a ll ow the

to entangle

in in te rn ational d i f f i c u l t i e s . " ^

the

She way had

n o w b e e n paved for the Tokyo Gover nm en t to e n t e r the confli ct
w i t h i nt e rn ational r e c o g n i t i o n of her course o f a c t io n in
China•

1 *Clyde,

o p , c 11 ., p. itl9.

nQ
Robert Young, ” J a p an at K i & o c h o w an d the Peace Con
ference,”
The C o n t e m p orary R ev ie w, CXV (March, 1919)* p. 281.
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Foreign Relations of the U n i t e d S t a t e s , 1911t» Supplemerit (Washington:
United States Government Printing Office,
19221 , p . l?p.

Japan declared war on Germany following the e xp ir a ti on

of her ultimatum on August 23, 1914#
role during the w a r w a a the capture

Tokyo1a maj or mi 11 tary
of Taingtac,

(and brief

m e n t i o n w ill be made of this campa ig n as well as soma of the
other m i l it ar y actions in wh i c h Japan participated}®

Klao-

ehow ia situated on the e astern extremity of the Shantung
peninsula*

Tsingtao,

'the capital city, was the site of the

German admin is tr a tl ve center for

the leased t e r r it o ry w h i c h

comprised approximately 200 square miles.
a considerable

The Germans

spent

sura of m on ey in c o n st r uc ti ng modern facilities

and in impro vi ng the Ki a o e h o w Bay wh i c h had one of the finest

20

n a tural harbors in the Orient.'-’
divided into land and w a

German defense f o rc es were

defenses with, the land forces being

charged with p r o t e c t i o n against attack f r o m the north*

The

principal line of defense consisted of five organised tactical
in f anter 1 ewerke , each w i t h from two to three hundred men*
the rear

To

of these forts w e r e about $0 h e av y 37 mm* machine

guns f or close defense of the positions®
located on'the hills for both land and

Heavy batteries were

sea defense*

The

Ger

man forces consisted of about 3*300 regular troops w h i c h were
suppiemen ted by 1, 2 0 0 reservists who had been called to active

^ % T a n c i s J, Reynolds, Allen L* Churchill and F rancis
T* Killer, The S tory of the G r e a t War (New York:
?. F*
Co1 11 a r and B o n , t s i 677 m
,- w r i t f - w .
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duty from, their homes scattered all over the Far Last•
The Japanese plan called for an expeditionary force
under the command of Lieutenant General Kamlo, consisting of
the 13th Independent Division, reinforced by artillery and
support troops.

An additional force of 1,369 British troops

from the British garrisons in forth China was attached to the
Japanese forces.

The Nipponese troops landed at Lungkow on

September 2, 191i|, and marched 200 miles overland to Tsingt&o.
The port at Laoshan was later utilized since It was only Ip
miles from Tsingtao.

On -September 27th, the Japanese arrived

at the outer defense posts of the city and captured Prinz
Heinrich Hill,

The Japanese were in no immediate hurry to ob

tain. a victory since the Germans were bottled up within the
city and had no hope of escape.

A general siege began on Oc

tober 31sfc, which was the Mikado*s birthday, and Ilf.2 heavy
guns, joined by Japanese ships which blockaded the harbor, be«
gan a bombardment which lasted seven days.

The Germans had

expended most of their supplies and surrendered the garrison
,
22
on Hoveuber 7 , IGlg,
The German naval units under the

^Horner Case, "The Capture of Tsingt&u," (unpublished
research study, The Command and General Staff School, Fort
Leavenworth, Kansas, 1933)* pp* 6-10.
pp
““John C. Ferguson, 'Japan*s Use of her Hegemony,”
North American He view, CCX (Oct., 1919), p. Ii-53; The Literary
IIIgo s t~HIs b ory of 'tne World War (Hew Yorks
Funk ar73 WaSnalTs

~ ~ I 9Wjttks'TprrsB^rfu.
■
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c omasand of Admiral Spee managed to escape fron Ts Ingtao prior
to tbs arrival of the Japanese naval units*

Admiral Spee13

fleet of four cruisers initially hid in the waters near the
Carolines; they then boldly came out from hiding and went
north, passing by Guam and the Marianas and eventually made
their way to the Falkland Islands where they were defeated
23
on December 8th,
China was greatly upset by the passage of foreign
troops outside of the leased territory and filed a vigorous
protest when Japanese troops seized the Shantung Hailway be
tween Tsingtao and Tsinanfu*

The Chinese Government also an

nounced a "special” war zone to which they sought to confine
the military operations of the belligerents,

This was large

ly ignored by th© Japanese and thus, soon withdrawn by China
2k
when it proved, impossible to make It effective.
Following; the capture of Tsingtao, the Japanese troops
took over complete control of the leased territory,
ber

2

01
.
'i i-J©CO „’l—

k* I9II4., the victors announced new provisional regulations

for the Custom House and required that all customs documents
be written in Japanese*

Th© Japanese Government refused to

accept any of the candidates nominated for th© post of

O "3

^Palk,

op. c It *, p. 219; Porter, op, c it», p* 25k*

^ G , Zay Wood, The Shantung Question (Hew York: Flem
ing K. He veil Co., 192FJT pp. ^'8-5.9♦
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Customs Commissioner by the Chinese Government and operated
the service, with their own customs personnel*

Finally, an

agreement was reached on August 6 , 1915 by which the Chinese
Heritime Customs Office was reopened with the Japanese Gov
ernment exercising all rights formerly enjoyed by the German
Government.

29
^

In addition to the campaign at Tsingtao, Nipponese
naval units captured the German islands north of the equator,
most of which were In the Marshall and Caroline Croups•
the remainder of the war,

For

the Japanese Navy escorted .Austra

lian and New Zealand troopships an route to the Sues Canal
and performed, guard duty In the Pacific Ocean*

Nippon re

fused to send an ex.psditionary force to the Western Front on
the grounds that her obligations under the Alliance could be
beat discharged In the Far Hast.
modified in 191? when Go m a n
mex*chant vessels,

This viewpoint was somewhat

submarines attacked Japanese

Following these incidents, the Tokyo Gov

ernment dispatched three destroyer divisions to the Mediter
ranean where they Joined other Allied naval units In patrol
duties*
On January 18, 1915, the Japanese Ambassador at Peking,

^Wood,

op* ci_t*3 pp* 55-53*

2 ^Porter, o£. ci t., pp* 253-25!!*
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Mr* Hioki, presented a series of demands directly to the
President of China.

The demands had their origin in a long

series of grievances against- China and the cancellation of
the war zone was used as the occasion to retaliate.

The de

mands, written on Imperial War Office stationery, were pref
aced by the statement:

” * . • our great Imperial policy de

pends on our being able to avail ourselves of the world1s
general trend of affairs so as to extend our influence and
decide upon a course of action toward China which shall be
practical in execution.
Into five groups*

« *

dexrmnds were divided

Group I pertained to the Shantung prov

ince and Chins was requested to agree In advance to any 'un
derstanding which might be made between Japan and Germany in
reference to the disposition of the Carman rights In Shan
tung I China to promise not to cede to any third power any
land In or along the coast of Shantung; Japan to be permit
ted to construct a railway tc connect the KIaochow-Tsinan
network with Chefoe or Lxmgkow; certain cities and towns to
^
28
be opened as commercial centers.
Group II pertained to South Manchuria, and Eastern
Inner Mongolia*

The Chinese were asked to extend the lease

^?Brmis, on, cij;* , p. 206*
OA
’^Willoughby, op. cl t. a pp. igL1-1+22.

of Port Arthur, "Dr*iron and tha Antung-Hukdon Railroad

to nine-

fcy-nine years; Japans 30 subject3 to be poraifcted to lease or
own land for both farming and oommez*eial purposes; Japanese to
be permitted to travel or reside in South Manchuria and Eastern
Inner Mongolia $ China to obtain the consent of Nippon before
granting: any concessions to a third power for the construction
of railroads; the Tokyo Government to be consulted if any
foreign advisors required$ the control of the Kirin-Changehim
Railroad to be given to Japan for a period of nine ty-nino
years*

These demands were probably the most Important to the

Japs.nose since they would perpetuate their control in Couth
Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongol!a and protect the Korean
r**

b o r d e r }

Croup III pertained to the Han-Yah-Ping Company, a SinoJapanese company recently nationalized by China.

The Japanese

demanded that they be given joint owners hip of the company.
Such control would thereby give them access to the large minoral resources owned by the company in the Yangtze area*

30

In Group IV, Japan requested that China not cede or
lease to any other nation any harbor, bay or island along the
coast of China.

Finally,

Group V contained a series of general

demands which were considered especially obnoxious by the
Peking Government.

China was to employ influential Japanese

as advisors in political, financial and military affairs;
Japanese churches, schools and hospitals were to be given the
right to own land; propagation of the Buddhist religion in
China was to be permitted; police departments in all large
centers were to be jointly staffed by Chinese and Japanese; a
fixed amount of China1s ammunition requirements, (fifty per
cent was suggested), was to be purchased fro;. Japan or else a
SIno-Japanese arsenal was to be constructed; Nippon was to be
permitted to construct a railroad connecting Wuchang with Kiukiang and Kanehang with Chaochow and Hangchow; Japan was to be
consulted before borrowing money for the purpose of working
mines, building railways and constructing harbor works or dock11
yards in the Fukien province*
The Chinese Government revealed almost at once the na
ture and scope of the demands to the foreign press, the diplo
matic circles and the Chinese people.

While the Chinese nation

became violently incensed over the demands, the European Powers
were too involved in the war to become greatly concerned over
Issues in the Orient.

The demands made an unfavorable impres-

^ 2*®& ties and Agreements Wi t h and Co n c ern!
l ? 1 9 j IX 9™ p p T ' -1 £.35? ’Ennis', o p . c it., pu S3 7.

hlna 139^

55
sion upon the United States Government, particularly since
the Tokyo Government attempted to conceal the requests con
tained in Group V.

Washington objected to the issues in this

latter group and also considered it appropriate to make the
following statement concerning Japanese rights in Shantung*
South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia:
While on principle and under the treaties of lGlUi#
1658* 1668, and 1903 with China and the United States
has grounds upon which to base objections, to the Japan
ese
demands’1 relative to Shantung, South Manchuria
©nd East Mongolia, nevertheless, the united States
frankly recognises thet territorial contiguity create^
special relations between Japan and these dls trices *3E
The negotiations between the two countries extended for three
and one half months sod during this time, both China and the
Western Powers were becoming increasingly critical of Japan.
The leaders of the Tokyo Government obtained approval from the
Emperor to issue an ultimatum to Peking and on May 7th, the
Chinese Government was notified that & categorical reply to the
demands would he required before 6:00 p.m., on May 9th.

The

Chinese Government was now thoroughly alarmed and in return
for future negotiations with Japan on the demands in Group
the Chinese gave their consent to the other demands.

The re

vised agreements between the two nations were contained in
the Sino-Japanese Treaties of May 2$, 19X5 which were to be

3 ^ Foreign Halations of the United States, 1915 (Wash
ing ton: United Stales GoveFnmenT TrlWfTng Offica, 1928), p o •
105-1 1 1 .
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ratified by the President of China and the Emperor of Japan#
Under the Chinese Constitution, the treaties were also re
quired to be ratified by Parliament and since this was not
done, the Poking Government would later claim that the treaties
were invalid*

33

Upon learning of the acceptance of the ultimatum by
China, Secretary of State Bryan dispatched a note to China

and Japan which said in part:
• • • The Government of the United States has the
honor to notify the Imperial Japanese Government and
the Government of China that it cannot recognize any
agreement or undertaking which has been entered into
or which may be- entered Into between the Governments
of Japan and China, impairing the treaty rights of
the United States and its citizens in China, the po
litical or territorial integrity of the Republic of
China, or the international policy relative to China
commonly known as the open door policy.35In addition to facing domestic unrest and

strained re

lations with Japan, China was required to reconsider her rela
tions vis a vis Germany*

Following America’s break in diplo

matic relations with Germany on February 3, 1917, President
Wilson notified all the neutral countries that ha believed
it would 11make for the peace of the world if the

other neutral

powers can find it passible to take s i viiliar action to

31
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taken by this Government.11^

This statement, which was intend

ed to be general in scope, was irarcedlately used by the Amer
ican Minister at Peking, Mr* Paul S. Reinsch, as authority to
urge China to sever relations with Berlin.

Premier Tuan how

ever, was not willing to enter the war except for a price•
The Chinese demanded that they be given a military loan of
$10,000,00; allowed complete control over their forces and
supplies; and that the united States fund its share of the
Boxer Indemnity and urge the other Allied nations to do likowise."5

Reinsch was unable to communicate the terms to ''Wash

ington immediately since the cable line was broken.

Neverthe

less, the American Minister went ahead and intimated that the
'United States Government would approve China1s requests.

When

Washington learned of Reinsch*a action, the Minister was warn
ed against giving any further unauthorised promises or assur
ances since the Unite d States did not want to give the impres37
sion that it was buying China*a support.
In the meantime, in exchange for her support of China*3
entry into the war, Japan determined to obtain from the Allies
a pledge to support her claims to Shantung and the German

■^Fore ign Ralat ions of trie United States, 1917* Supple merit I ('Washington: United States Government Printing Office,
19llT) , p. 108.
3 6 I b l d . , pp. l4.Ol-l4.O2 .

_i.bjlcI■, p • Lj~uU .
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islands in the North Pacific as Tokyo realized that her tem
porary control over these German interests was subject to fi
nal disposition at the Peace Conference*

The first of a

series of written confirmations wars received in February of
191? when the British Ambassador, Conyngham Greene, handed
the following message to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign
Affairs;
With reference to the subject of our conversation
of the 2'7th ultimo when Your Excellency informed me
of the desire of the Imperial Government to receive
an assurance that, on the occasion of a Peace Confer
ence, His Britannic Msjest-y1s Government will snpport
the claims of Japan in regard to the disposal of Ger
many 5s rights in Shantung and possessions In the Is
lands North of the Equator, I have the honor, under
instructions received from His Britannic Majesty*s
Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to
communicate to Your .Excellency the following message
from His Britannie M a 1e ~ty*s Governmen 1 1
Els Majesty1s Government accedes with pleasure to
the request of the Japanese Government for an assur
ance that they will support Japan?s claims In regard
to the 6 .:.sposal of Germany ’a rights in Shantung ana
possessions in Islands North of Equator on tho occa
sion of Peace Conference., it being understood that
the Japanese Government will, in eventual peace
settlement, treat In the s&ra® spirit Great Bri >qinfa
claim to German Islands South of Equator** . ,*36
In a note dated March 1st, 1^X7, the French Government
gave similiar assurance a to Japan and also asked that Japan
wgive its support to obtain from. China the rupture of bar

38

"Wood, o£* c i t * a p* 63*
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diplomatic relations with Germany*”

The British and Branch

notes were followed by aim! liar assurances from Russia on
March 5, 1917 and Italy on March 23, 1 9 1 7 1 °

The question of entry into the war became the occasion
for a struggle for power between Premier Tuan and the Chinese
Parliament,

The Chinese people were largely pro-German and

there was no universal demand for entry into the war,

The

Kuomintaxig majority in Parliament was opposed to war since it
would give Tuan an excuse to perpetuate himself in office.
On May 10th* the Tuan Government attempted to force a decla
ration of war** however* the legislators would not give ground
in face of threats and* as a result* all the cabinet members
except Tuan and one colleague resigned.

President LI there

upon dismissed Tuan and dissolved Parliament,

Three weeks

later an. attempt was made to restore the young Manohu iSmperor
to the throne but the war-lords, supported by trie former Pre
mier* invaded Peking and restored Tuan to power*

Whereupon*

Tuan established a frankly pro-Jap&nese militarist government
and promptly declared wax* against Germany on August 11*., 191?*
It should be noted that China, made this declaration without

■^Wood* op , cit, * p, 69*
k°Ibia., PP. 7ip-76.
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any definite promises of financial support or other conces41
sions from The Allies*
Tokyo was greatly disturbed by America1s entry into the
war as the Japanese saspicioned that the United States intend
ed to check Nippon*s growing power in China and the Pacific*
Indeed, Lansing states that Japan could not understand Ameri
ca *s altruistic purpose of f?fighting for liberty and democracy
in Burc-pe *,!^

The Foreign Office also felt that the United

States was unduly Influencing Chines© foreign policy and It
was decided to send discount Ishil to tha United States In or
der to f?exchange with responsible American officials frank
views concerning problems In China and reach some form of un
derstanding and settlement *

At the same time* Washington

hoped to preserve the peace and status ouo

in the Pacific*

and thus, permit the United States to concentrate on the tfest~
hb
err. iront»
The IsJtiii Mission arrived In the United States
on September 1, 1917, bub serious negotlationa were not begun
until after the Viscount filled several speaking engagements
in which ho defended the t;Japanese Monro© Doc trS ne?f for A s l a * ^

^Clyde,

or, clt *, pp* 423-429

^ K o b e r t Lansing, Lansing War Memoirs (Indianapolis:
Babb-Merri 11 Co*, 19355, pp*--:
ishi.i, op., cif * * p* 112,
'^"Gr.1 swold, op* c i t *, p, 2 1 7 *
I

r

■> Eshli, op, cit* , p, 119.

61
Ishii had Interpreted the Monroe Doctrine as H as assertion of
primacy or paramount interest fcy the united States in its re
lations to other American republics,

• • •” and applied this

principle to Japan*s position in China.

Lansing, on the other

hand, argued that this was an incorrect interpretation and
that the Monroe Doctrine was actually Intended to prevent for
eign encroachments and permit the individual self-dev@lop.ment
46
of nations.
The American Secretary of State proposed that
the two nations formulate an *Open-Door* policy which would
serve the purpose of alleviating tensions, particularly in
China.

The two diplomats gave much time to the phrasing of a

statement which they intended to issue and when Mr. Lansing
inquired as to the definition of Japan*a interests in China,
Ishii replied that the term nparamount interests” was thought
to be the correct expression.

Lansing objected to this as it

implied that other nations would be obligated to acquiesce to
any action undertaken by Japan in Chine.

After considerable

discussion, the phrase n special interests” was substituted for
wparamount Interests.”

Notes Incorporating the Lansing-Ishii

agreement were exchanged on November 2, 1917*

The agreement

was immediately subjected to misinterpretation on both sides

Foreign Relations of the United $ tates » The Lansing
Papers . (Wasiilngton: IjnTted States Government Printing Office,
19u0 f, il» ?• 436,
(Hereafter cited as The Lansing, Papers ).
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and controversy developed when Japan interpreted the tern
"special interests" in the sense of the Japanese equivalent
word r1-e k l ; this word can only be used in its literal inter
pretation meaning advantage, prof it, or concrete interests.
Lansing had only intended the term to be used in its economic
and. non-political sense.

The notes caused much dissatisfac

tion in both the United States and China and the declaration
was finally abrogated in 1923•

hi

The Russian revolution of 191? resulted in the overthrow
of the Imperial Tsarist Government in favor of a liberal con
stitutional monarchy.

The Lvov-Xerensky regimes lasted only

eight months and were followed late in 1917 by the Bolsheviks
who promptly sued for peace with G e r m a n y . ^

The French and

British were alarmed over the prospect of increased enemy
forces on the Western Front and the two nations proposed the
intervention of Japan to eliminate the threat of an enemy
UQ
penetration along the Slno-Siberlan border***" General Dimi
tri L. liorvat, manager of the Chinese Eastern Railroad, at
tempted to organize an anti-Bolshevik .force and obtained the
support of a Cossack, Captain Gregory Semenov.

The Horv&t-

\;*7
^ 'Jeremiah W. Jenks, "Japan in Action," North American
Review, OCX (Sept., 1919), p. 319; Griswold, op'7 eft.7 p p ,
"SXBy'Tshii, oo. olt., pp. 127-133,
^ G e o r g e Vernadsky, A History of Russia (New Havens
Yale Hnivers Ifcy Press , 19$ii7,~pp. 23i$-k9b»
k9curry, op. cit. , p. 211;..
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Semenov forces obtained the support of the British, French
and Japanese Governments and operated along the Trans-Siber
ian Railroad area where they
30
by the ir* brutal ity •

6

Istlnguished the raseIves larg el./

The British Jar Cabinet was concerned over the possibil
ity t hat 61|J3,000 tons of military supplies In Siberia would
fall into the hands of the Reds and Sir Robert Cecil of the
British Foreign Office formally proposed the military inter
vention of Japan in Siberia*

Washington immediately rejected

this proposal and Ambassador Roland Morris advised the Poreign Office that such Intervention would only serve to aid
German propaganda..

President Wilson was quite upsot over the

proposal and wrote that he did not know "whan he had ever had
a more tiresome struggle with quicksand than in trying to do
tha right thing in respect with our dealings with Russia*

bl

In an effort to out-m&nouver Wilson, the British brought
the ir proposal before tha Supreme War Council In Paris.

Since

the decisions of the Council required unanimity, the American
Delegate, General Tasker Bliss, referred the question back to
Washington.

The United States made cle ar its stand on Japan

ese intervention In the following message:

WQ
^ Curry, oo. cit., p. 21>.
si
Curry, op. clt., citing Wilson Papers, I I ,
p • 6iq.

p. 133 > V I ,

6!f

It has no objection to the request being made* and
It wishes to assure the Japanese Government that It
has entire confidence that in putting an armed force
Into Siberia It is doing so as an ally of Russia, with
no purpose but to save Siberia from tha invasi on of
the armies and the intrigues of Germany and with entire
willingness to leave the determination of all questions
that may affect the permanent fortun©a of Siberia to
the- Council of Peace *2*After some misgivings on giving Japan tacit approval
to intervention, the original message was withdrawn and In a
subsequent message, Wilson declared that it would be unwise
to Intervene as it would play into the hands of both Germany
cf i

and the enemies of the revolution.

However, Great Britain

was not undaunted in her efforts and again proposal Interven
tion to Wilson*

In the meantime, rumors circulated that

SO,000 German and American prisoners were occupying Irkutsk
and this event, together with the opening of the German
spring offensive, favored the hopes of the interventionists*
Following Allied reverses in the war and repeated pleas from
the British, Wilson authorized discussions between Lansing
and IshiI on the subject*

The Japanese had already landed

troops in Vladivostok following the murder of a few Japanese
and the precedent for Intervention was already established*
Further support was gained when Wills on learned that some

<Z
^

fne Lan«l n& Papers „ El, p.

"'-'Curry, op* clt*, p* 223,

'

JO,000 Czooh forces were bottled up at Irkutsk and that they
desired to raake their way to Vladivostok and eventually back
to Fra no e by you In order to continue fighting Germany,

V/II-

aon now reluctantly agreed to Intervention and raade his deciSij,
si on known to his staff.
The United States proposed that e&oh of the two nations
furnish J ,000 -nan for the purpose of guarding the linos of
connunlcatton in Siberia and that Japan was to immediately dis
patch troops while those from the United States would follow
later#

The Japanese Government delayed In answering the pro

posal and the Acting Secretary of state, Frank L* Polk, thought
that this delay was prompted by the question of command over
the joint expedition and, with Wilson1a consent, the Japancso were advises that they could have the senior position#^"*
Tokyo replied on July 2!yth that It could not set a limit on
the number of troops since this would show lack of confidence
on the part of the United States In Nippon13 motives,
however,

Ishii,

indicated that the Japanese intended to send 12,000

troops end Polk replied that Washington would not object to
o/
trio dispatch of a Division#^

Peyton 0. March, "Japanese Strategy in the Par East."
Yale Review, XXIII (Sept. 1933), p. 3!+.
■•'r'
ob
^Cu r r y , op# cit., pp* 231-232#
^ X b i d ,, p* 23k*

The American contingent of 9*000 troops was placed
under the command of Major General Milllam S* Graves•

The

Japanese claimed that the United States * by exceeding the
7,000 figure, abrogated the original agreement and rapidly in
creased their forces from about 10,000 to 60,000 men and ex
tended their control along the Trans-SIberian and Chinese
Eastern Railroads.

The railroads were later placed under the

control of a technical board with an American, Mr. John P.
Stevens, in charge but were actually operated by the Russian
Railway Service Corps.

67

Most of the nations participating in the intervention
relied upon Whit© Russian groups for aid.

Trie Japanese re

lied mainly on the Cossacks, the worst of whom was Semenov.
The Cossack leader was merciless in dealing with his enemies!
he delighted in sending out indiscriminate raiding parties,
robbing banks and pilfering freight shipments.

It has been

argued that the Japanese supported the Semenov faction in
order to keep Siberia in a state of unrest which would re
quire their presence to maintain order.

The Japanese later

sought to establish Semenov as the puppet leader of a PanMongol movement which would unite the Mongolian people under
Nippon.

The movement failed due to lack of financial support

and the Inability to organize the various national groups#

67
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In 1918, China and Japan entered into a series of agreements which later proved damaging to China at the Paris
Peace Conference*

Notes were signed between the Chinese Min

ister In Tokyo, Tsung-Hsiang Chang, and Baron Shimpel Goto,
the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs#

Wood claims that

the Minister exceeded his authority in negotiating with the
Japanese and that the agreements were illegal since they were
59
not ratified by the Chinese Government.
There is no doubt
however, that the government authorities were well aware of
the discussions and it is apparent that money considerations
out-weighed other factors.

The first two agreements related

to the construction of the two railroads in Shantung between
Tsinan aid Shunteh and Kaomi and Hsu-chow.

The Chinese Gov

ernment agreed to borrow the necessary capital in Tokyo to
finance the construction of these railroads and agreed, If the
Japanese considered them inadequate from a standpoint of op
erations, to allow them to construct slmiliar facilities in
other areas in Shantung.

Meanwhile, the Chines© pledged the

railways as security for the construction loans, estimated at
70,000,000 yen.

At the same time, the two countries entered

58

ton:

John Albert White, The Siberian Intervention (Prince
Princeton University Press, 19^0J, p p . 193-265.
59
_
^ Wood, o p . c l t ., p. 98.

into similiar arrangements for the construction of four other
rail systems:

between Changchun and Taonan; Kai-yuan, Hai-

lung and Kirin; Taonan and Dalny; Taonan and Jehol to a sea
port, the exact location of which was to be determined at a
later date.

All of these lines were located in Manchuria and

Mongolia and wez^e considered of strategic importance to the
60
Japanese,
In addition, Tokyo also agreed to pay Peking
20,000,000 for the purpose of underwriting a "War Participa
tion Loan1’ which would be used for the purpose of organizing
a defensive array and to pay expenses of participating in the
61
war. '

Actually, this money was needed by Premier Tuan to

hold out against dissident elements in the south and had lit62
tie bearing upon China1s war efforts, which were negligible.
Perhaps the most damaging of all the provisions was the agree
ment that provided for the withdrawal of Japanese troops from
Kiaochow and the connecting railroad to Tsinan in return for a
Chinese agreement that the line would become a joint enterprise.
Japanese personnel were to be employed at the Headquarters and
training school of the Chinese police force as well as at the
principal railway stations.

This latter agreement served to

^°MaoMurray, op. clt., II, pp. li4.lfS-li1.5 2 .
^Willoughby, o£. cit., pp. 395-396.
^2Wood, op. cit., p. 96.
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bolster Tokyo*s claims for concessions in the province when
63
the Peace Conference met in Paris*
By the time the Armistice was declared in November of
1913* the Japanese completely dominated Eastern Siberia*

Sec

retary Lansing protested this by stating, nThe United States
has viewed with surprise the presence of the large number of
Japanese troops now in north Manchuria and eastern Siberia.
...

Such monopoly is certainly opposed not only to the pur

pose of this Government to assist Russia but also to its
views regarding C h i n a . F o l l o w i n g

this protest, the Japan

ese managed to remove about 50,000 troops from the areas
specified by the Secretary.

Nevertheless, they did not relin6ii
quish their control over Siberia until 1 9 2 2 . ^
Japan had now gained most of her announced objectives*
Through her alliance with Great Britain she played a limited
role in the Great War yet reaped benefits in excess of what
was justified by her wartime efforts*

From a weak Chinese

Government whom ah© had openly bribed with money and threats,
Tokyo obtained legal recognition of its foothold in China.
By means of secret agreements with the European Powers, she
gained, prior to the Peace Conference, support for her claims

63

Wood, o£. ci t *, p. 314*

^ ‘H'/hite, op* cl t*, p* 210.
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to the German Islands north of the equator and on the Shantung
peninsula.

By participation in the Siberian intervention, she

extended her influence and control throughout Eastern Siberia
and even dreamed of a puppet state in Mongolia which would be
dependent upon Japan.

CHAPTER V
WE

PATUR PEACE CONFERENCE

Japan entered the .Peace Conference negotiations with
the status of a Greet Power.

This standing was granted only

after some misgivings on the part of the leader of the French
Delegation, M. Georges Clemenceau, who declared:
W© have agreed that Japan should have five delegates
like the Great Powers.
Japan participated in the war
in the Far East, but who can
that in the war she
played a part that can be compared for instance to that
of France? Japan defer dad It# interests In fh© Far
last but when she was requested to intervene in Europe,
©vovyon© knew what the answer was. ...**•
In a plan submitted to Colonel House by the French
Foreign Office and Tatar incorporated into the Jcsstrsnd not©
of November 29, X?18, addressed to th© ?lnit©d States Govern
ment, Japan was not 3.1stad as one of the Great Powers that
would discuss the preliminary organisation of th© Peace Con
ference.

However,

in a meeting held on December 2 and

3.*

1918, the Premiers of Franc®, Great Britain, and Italy had
agreed that the Tokyo Government should be included as on© of
the Greet Powers to w e t at an Inter-Allied Conf crane©

At

Poreig.n Halations of thn United States-The Paris Peace
Conference» 1919 TWaahington: Inited States Government Print
ing Office, 3943)» III, p. 506.
{Hereafter cited as Paris
Peace Conference).
2

Pai m s

Peace Conference, I, pp. 3U1, 3t>5-371 •
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the first session, the Japanese were advised by M. Clemeneeau,
the President of the Conference, that they would be granted
the right to attend all sessions and commissions.

While the

Tokyo delegation was obviously pleased with this recognition,
Viscount Ishli commented that his government’s position was
not due t o "any good-will or patronage on the part of the oth
er powers," but to the "united efforts of her officials and
peoples under the leadership of the emperors Hoiji and Taisho*
and "her participation in the London Declaration."^
After the Conference became organized, tho Supreme War
Council was replaced by the Council of Ten, with two represen
tatives each from the United States, Great Britain, France,
Italy and Japan.

This council met from the opening of the ses

sions in January until late in March when the workload was
shif ted, first, to the five Foreign Ministers
Five, and then to the
the Council of Four.

Council of

Premiers who were designated as
The Nipp on delegation was not entirely

happy with this latter arrangement.

It was explained to them

that since their Premier was not in attendance at Par*! 3, they
would be excluded from the deliberations of this group.

How

ever, President Wilson instructed Colonel House to assure
Baron Makino that the Japanese would be given an opportunity

^Ishii, op. ci t., p. 103.
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to participate in world matters not concerning purely European affairs.

k

The Hippon delegation consisted of the following five
members:

Marquis Salonji Kiramochi, former Premier, the second

President of the Selyukai Party, and genro or elder statesman;
Viscount Chinda Suterai, Ambassador to Great Britain; Mr. Matsui Keishiro, Ambassador to France; Mr. Ijuin Kanetomo, Ambassiidor to Italy.
the Hara. Government*

The delegation was carefully selected by
Prince Salonji was a distinguished

statesman and nobleman who had previously met Clemeneeau while
a student in Francs about 1870.

Baron Makino was appointed

a plenipotentiary at the specific request of Marquis Salonji
and the Baron, together with Viscount Chinda, participated in
the sessions while trie aged leader mainly stayed In his suit©
at the Hotel Bristol.

6

Th© other three members were drawn

from the important diplomatic posts of London, Paris and Home.
It was readily apparent at the peace Conference that
the Japanese delegation members were mainly interested in
matters affecting their own country and were little concerned

^"Russell H. Fifield, Hood row Wilson and the Far has t
(New York:
Thome.s Y. Crowell G o . , l^TS'JT^pT~TlTgT~
^Yanaga, op. c 11 ., p. 3^8; Takeuchi, op. cit., pp. 220A
°Takeuohi, op. c1fc., p. 221.

over the affairs of Europe •

7
1

The delegation received its in

structions from the Gaiko Chosaks.i or Advisory Council on
Foreign Relations and had but little leeway in making indepenQ
dent decisions on policy matters.'
The Nippon diplomatic rep
resentatives can}.© to Paris with the determination, that Japan
would not be reduced to the status of a second or third class
power and with the specific objectives of obtaining the ces
sion of the German rights In Shantung; permanent control over
the German Islands north of the Equator; a declaration of ra
cial equality as a. basic principle of the League of Nations.^
The Chine se delegation, which was destined to become
the main foe of the neighboring Nippon, consisted of an e~
qually distinguished group who wore undoubtedly better able
to communicate and play upon the sympathy of the other na-

10

tions:

Lou Tseng-slang, Minister of Foreign Affairs and

head of the delegation; Cheng-ting Thomas Wang, former Minis
ter of Agriculture and Commerce; VI Kyuin Wellington Koo, Min
ister at Washington; Sao-Ke Alfred 3ze, Minister at London;
Suntchou Wei, Minister at Brussels.

The Peking group hoped

?Yanaga, op. cit. , p. 363.
8
'Takeuebl, op. ci t., p. 221; Ishii, o p . clt., p. xii.
9
Boyama Masamichi, Foreign Policy of Japan (Tokyo:
Japanese Council, Ins ti tute of P a d fi c Relati ons , 19l|A), p. 28,
10

Treat, Japan and the United States, p. 231.
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to obtain the cancellation of the Boxer Indemnity; the return
of Shantung; the abolishment of extraterritoriality and other
special rights held by foreign nations in China; the recogni
tion of the right of China to fix her own tariff rates and the
abrogation of demands conceded to Japan by the Treaties of 1915
and 1913*-^
Fresident Wilson hoped that the subject of the League
of Nations would be given the first priority followed by the
subjects of (2)

Reparation; (3)

and territorial changes;

(5)

New States; (I*.) Frontiers

Colonies.

12

Lloyd George# at a

meeting of the Council of Ten held on January 23, 1919# op
posed this agenda on the grounds that wOriental questions and
Colonial questions were less invoiced,” and could be disposed
of more quickly.

Wilson replied that ” the worldTs unrest a-

roee from the unsettled condition of Europe, not from the
state of affairs In the East or in the Colonies. . .

The

President however, did not insist upon his agenda and the sub
ject of the disposition of the colonies came up for discussion
11
the next day .
The Nippon case for the retention of the former German
islands came up for discussion at a meeting of the Council

^Steiger* op. ci t., p. 769*
12
Paris Peace Conference# III, p. 700.
1h b i d ., pp. 713-719.
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on January 2?th#

Pour alternatives were open to the Council

concerning the former German colonies:
tion;

(2)

tlon;

(4 }

restoration to Germany;

(3)
Ik
placement under a mandate#

(1)

outright annexa

1n to r ns.tlonallzaThs Tokyo- delegation

already knew that Australia, Hew Zealand and trie Union of
fouth Africa strongly favored annexation, while Groat Britain
preferred m mandate system*

Britain, France and Italy ware

already committed to support Illppon*s claim and It was almost
pro-doter mined that Japan would retain control over the coloi c*
dies by one of the above means#
President Wilson opened the
discussion by suggesting that the appropriate delegations be
'beard prior to making any piecemeal disposition of the Pacific
colonies*

In the procedural discussion that followed, it was

agreed that the Dominion delegates should participate in the
Ifipponese presentation concerning the colonies while China
would attend the dissuasions ooncerninc S U o e h o M . 3,6
Baron Kakiiao opened his ease by declaring;
The Japanese Government feels Justified in claiming
from the German Government the unconditional cession
of:
(a) The leased territory of Kiaoohow together
with the railways, and other rights possessed by Ger
many In respect of the Gh&ntung drovince#
(b) All of
the Islands in German possession In the Pacific Ocean

^ P a r i s Peace Confer®moo» III, pp* 713-719*
^ G e o r g e H# Blakeslee, nThe Mandates of the P&olflCf **
foreign Affairs* I (fept., 1922), pr>. 99-100.
?lfield, op.
cTtTTp.T^:
^Paris

Peace Q onferenoa, 111, p, 737*
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north of the Equator together with the rights and
properties In connection therewith*
The Japanese forces have, in conjunction with
the Briti sh contingents, succeeded h taking the
leased territory aa well as the railway line con
necting Tslngtau with Chlnanfu* which the Germans
used for military purposes* Japan, has continued
in possession of the rights enjoyed by Germany.
The clrcurnstances demanded that the German South
Sea Islands should forthwith be taken possession of
In order to defeat the enemy*a object, and the Ger
man possessions north of the Equator have since re
mained under Japanese occupation and control* • « .
Japan being in actual possession and having regard
to the circumstances which led to such occupation
and to the present conditions above alluded to, and
further, in view of the public opinion of Japan which
is unanimous In this connection, she claims the def
inite possession of these Islands where she may con
tinue to protect the Inhabitants and to endeavor to
better their conditions.
In conclusion, it may be stated that, In view of
the extent of their efforts and achievement® In des
troying German, bases in the Extreme Orient and the
South
and in safeguarding the Important routes
on the Pacific and Indian Oceans and the Mediterran
ean waters to say nothing of their contribution In
other respect®, the Japanese Government feel® confi
dent that the claims above advanced would be regarded
a® only just and fair. *
Upon conclusion of the speech, Doctor Hang of the Chi
nese delegation asked, the Council to reserve decision until
C M n a also had the opportunity to b© heard.

18

The meeting of the Council on January 28th brought to
light the existence of the secret treaties between China and

^ Paris Peace Conference. Ill, pp. 738- 740.
l8I M d .. p. 754.

?3
Japan and the ensuing discussions over these treaties had
ramifications all the way back to Tokyo and Peking*

This

meeting also marked the only time when both of the Oriental
19
countries argued face-to-face before the council*
Lloyd
George opened the session by stating that Britain was willing
to follow the mandate system insofar as territory conquered
by her was concerned*

Clemence&u then followed by stating

that fee thought that any contentions concluded by the parties
to the hearing should be brought before tbs Council and asked
whether Japan would agree to this action*

Baron Mskino re

plied that "he had no objection in doing b o / and would send
all such agreements to fee Chairman*

Ms kino was only refer

ring to the secret agreements of 1917 reached with the Euro
pean Powers.

The Council went on to discuss the Kiaochow

Issue and Clemenceau asked fee Oriental delegates if they
were prepared to .lay before the Council any agreements or en
gagements undertaken between the two nations.

Makino, some

what taken aback at this request stated that he must first

ao

obtain permission from his home government*

He then want on

to say, "Japan was in actual possession of the territory,*1
p d a o c h o w ] , and "before disposing of it to a third party it
was necessary that Japan should obtain the right of free dis~

^ Paris reace Conference» III, p* 754*
z oi M a „

pp. 75^-755.
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poaal from Germany.?l
Doctop Hoc then followed wi th a brilliant presentation
of China1s case.

The delegate cited the fact that he was

spokesman for over i|X)0 millions or one quarter of th® human
race#

He flatly asked the Council for tfaa restoration to Chi

na of the Leased Territory, th# railway in Shantung and all
other rights Germany possessed before the war.

Koo then went

on to cite the diplomatic history concerned with the leasehold
and that while Chins appreciated Japanfs efforts during the
war, China now asked for direct restitution to the Peking Gov2*1
ernment of all of Germany*s rights in Shantung* ~
The meeting on January 27 th was but a forerunner of
further difficulties for the Nipponese delegation and Makino
and the other members realised that they would have to face
th© hostility of not only China but also the United States*
Lou Tseng-tslang had stopped off at Tokyo on th© way to th©
Peace Conference and had a talk with Foreign Minister TJchida.
Tlx© Japanese were lad to believe that China would cooperate
with them at Paris and thus were quite surprised to note Tsengtsiangfs absence with Ko© acting as spokesman for th® delegation«

22

China, on the other hand, feared a reprisal for as

senting to produce th® texts of the secret agreements*

2 1 Paris Peace Conference, III, pp. 755-756.
22Plfi eld, ££♦ cd t *, p. l!*0.

This

Bo
real” was not without foundation for on February 2# 1919# Min
ister Ohata foriklchi called upon Mr* Chen-Lu, Chinese Acting
Minister of Foreign Affaire, and expressed the Tokyo Govern
ment 1a displeasure at the trend of events at Paris*

Obata

reminded chen~»Lu of the strength of the Japanese Array and Ha23
vy and of China's heavy indebtedness to her neighbor*
The
American Ambassador# Mr* Paul Belnsch# was instructed by
President Wilson to advise the Chinese Government to sfstand
2ii
firm55 and not give in to the Nipponese#
Nevertheless# the
Chineso Cabinet at first decided not to publish the secret
agreements but upon President Hsu Shih-ch’ang** insistence#
the texts of the agreements were eventually published# ^
The racial © q u a l i t y issue cam® u p for discussion dur
ing the month of February#

The basic Instruction to the

Tokyo delegation reads
The imperial Japanese Government considers the League
of Nations the moat Important organisation of peace and
agrees to its purpose* However, the racial discrimina
tion still prevailing in international relations would
endanger the very purpose for which the League of Ma
il ons was constituted#
This situation may bring consid
erable disadvantage to our nation* * • .You are instructed
to exert your utmost effort in order to obtain as far as
possible the necessary guarantee against any possible

23Pifi®ld, 0£, clt., p. 145.
21*Griswold, 0£, clt., p. 245.
2^PJ.field, C£. clt., p. 154.
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<31 sadvanteg© that may he caused by this racial
prejudice*S6
Baron Ms kino sad viscount Chirclc, decided to seek out
Color*eI hour?# and ask him for assistance in preparing the
racial equality resolution.*

The Colonel recommended that

they nropa.ro two proposalsj one which they desired, and one
which tlioy would ha wiXXir.g to accept in lieu of thalr first
proposala

douse later showed

^resident Vi Ison the two

drafts*

?he first proposal, war Immediately discarded as too

radical. #

The President used a some changes in the second pro

posal and tha draft m s

handed back to C h i n d m # ^

The Japan-

#®o ccnoidared thle latter revision too watered-down mad
meaningless and prepared their own version which was submit
ted to the Censnlseion on the league of Hattons on February
?th in the following form?
The equality of nations being a basic principle
of the league of nation#, the High, Contracting Bar tie a
agree to accord# as soon aa possible, to all alien
national# of State# members of the League equal and
Just treatment in every respect, making no distinction,
either in law or in fact, on account of their race or
miiomlltjv-^
The resolution was vigorously opposed by Lord Robert Cecil
at a meeting of the Plenary Session held on February 13th and

^Fifield# op* pit* . p# 153# citing letter to author
from Japanese correspon3eht, March 15# 1951#
Houm

^ C h a r l e s Seymour# (ed*} yha Intimate gapers qf Colonel
(Boston? Houghton# Kifflin'an<T WoV$ X 9 S 8 }# 'pp« 3 W - 5 T S 7

2®Dmvia Hunter Hiller# The Drafting of the Covenant
---(New iorkt Doubleday, Page «i3nfo7; I922t,"T17T.
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the matter was temporarily dropped.

However, a few weeks

later, President V/ilaon was handed a message by the Japanese
delegatee making for further aasi stance in drafting a racial
equality clause stating that "any suggestions from the Presi
dent will be entertained wi £h groat pleasure ,”^9

Following

the President* a return fron Paris on March 14th, the

Nippon

ese decided to deal directly with their opponents and visited
Premier Hughes of .Australia and advised him that their pro
posal 11seeks only the recognition of the principle but does
„ 10
not request immediately any concrete measures#
The dele
gates were unsuccessful in swaying
a week later,

the Australian loader and

they visited Colonel Mouse and showed him a new

proposal which reads

A m a principle of the league of Nations, the High
Contracting Hartley agree to endorse the principle of
equal and
just treatment to be accorded to^all alien
nationals
of states members of the League#-*
(The collection of the House Papers by Seymour makes no refer
ence to this proposal)#

Prime Hinlster Hughes would not agree

to any form of racial equality provisions being adopted and
when a revised proposal was brought before the Dominion Prime
Ministers, Hughes stomped out of the room declaring,

fIt Is

pa
•Ray Stann&rd Baker# Woodrow Wilson and World Settle
ment (Hew forks
Doubleday, A & T S O T 5 5 7 7 1 9 ^ , T T r T p T ^ ^
^ F i f i e l d , o p , clt#, p* 163, citing letter to author
from Japanese correspondent, March 15, 1951#
3^Xbid*, p, 163*

not a question of w o r d i n g or phraseology*
ates

the whole

Australia repudi

Idea behind this proposition.

to act on your own*
of s u c h opposition,

Y o u are free

I shall m a in ta in my stand* 1
the Tokyo delegates decided

In spite
to submit a

proposal to the League of Hafelons Commission on April 11th,
asking that the preamble of the C ov e na nt be amended’ to include
the clause,

f!by the endorsement of the principle of the ©~

qua li ty of HatIona and the just tree femenfe of their n a t i o n a l s ”
w i t h o u t making any specific mention of the controversial term

r’race* ,f

Lord Cecil replied

to the flipponese proposal

that

w ould be e nc r o a c h i n g upon the sovereignty of the members

the League and that he would vote against the measure *

of

Vis

co u n t Chlnda strongly retorted that the Japanese people

behind the proposal and that if It was rejected,

It

were

it w ould b©

a n indication that eq ua li ty of members was not recognised by
the League.
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President Wilson was placed in a delicate s ituation
since he was p re s i d i n g at the vote of the Commission*
el e v e n members present, representing Japan, France,
Brazil,

While

Italy,

Greece, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and China voted

for the measure, Wilson ruled that u n a n i m i t y was required

Bk

and the proposal was defeated.3^

The Japanese nation was

greatly distressed over this defeat and President Wilson
shared the major portion of the blame with the Osaka Main!chi
declaring that ”be had a female demon within h i m .?!35
Tii© Nipponese delegation was now firmly determined not
to yield on the Shantung issue.

Their Instructions from the

Gaiko Chosakai read:
In compliance with the terms of the official doc a*
ments exchanged In connection with the Japanese-Chi
nese agreement of 'May 2 ?, 191?, in the matter of the
province ol Shantung, our Impire has the ualinite in
tention of returning the Fiaochow Bay settlement to
China after we acquire the unconditional cession of
said settlement in the treaty with Germany. Naturally
there will be no objections to the indication of this
decision by our peace envoys at any proper opportunlty.
However, our government cannot agree to make retroces
sion a condition for the assignment of the said settle
ment from Germany to Japan. It must be clearly under
stood that this matter shqpld be settled absolutely
by Japan and China aiono.^°
The Shantung Isaac was presented to the Council of Four
at the meeting hold on April 3th, when the Council reviewed
a list of subjects awaiting consideration, the last of which
read;

?TJapanese questions as regards Kiaochou

sic and Shan-

*57

tung.-*1

While waiting for their appearance before the Council

-^Miller, op. d t., I, pp. J4.6l-I1.66.
3-^PIfield, op. cl t., p. 169, citing Osaka Main!chi.
3 ^Russell H. Fifield, nJapanese Policy toward the Shan
tung Quo 31x on at the Paris Peace Conference,
The Journal of
Modern History XXIII (Sept. 1951), p* 267*
3^Paria Feace Conference, V, p. 65•

35
the Nipponese delegation occupied themselves with pourparlers
in an effort to strengthen fcboir eaao,

The Advisorj Council

on Foreign Relations dispatched the following additional In
structions to Marquis Salonji*
Regarding your telegram Eo* Ho* 620, the policy
of our empire In regard to loo negotiations relative
to Tsingtau is, as stated In our telegram Ko. No*
126, to acquire the -same uaeonditionally from Germany
and to return the same to China according to the terms
of the Japanese-Chinaas agreement*
filla is the final
decision, of our government and no change Is perm! a sable*
Therefore in case our proposal la not approved or tlm
mandatory principle under the League of Nations Is
applied to our terms on Tsingtau, do not sign the Cove
nant of the League of Rations and advise us to that
effect* If you have made certain committments against
the above mentioned policy, there will bo no room for
ad justment,
Therefora, do your utmoat undor tha circurns lanen s * 0
At the afternoon session of the Council of Four, held
on Apr! 1 21st, Wilson reported the substsmeo of a conversa
tion that morning with i'-iaklno and C M n d a ,

The President sug

gested that all claims in the Pacific * should be ceded to the
Allied and Associated rowers aa trustees leaving them to make
fair and just dispositions**

The Japanese ware reminded that

they already received a mandate for the German islands north
of the Equator*

The dalegates retorted that they were nset

on obliging China to carry out the bond,* and that the Powers

3®F1 field, 11Japanese Policy toward the Shantung QueS'
tion at the Paris Peace Conference,* pp* 267-268,
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ahould ”trus t Japan, to carry out hep bargain with China
The following day, the Council met at President Wil

son* a house with Baron Hakino as the first speaker at the se@*
si on#

Makiao gave a long and detailed resrnie of the Kl.aoeh.ow

1# asobol C3

r
"3tij*

win.st the lease was abrogated, ipso facto,

by Chine*s declareti on cf w a r .

Upon conclusion of his speech,

Mr# George retorted that the other nations suah as Australia
might make a almillar claim for the surrender of German terri
tory and that therj was hardly time to settle all such matter*
before signing the treaty wi th Germany,

Viscount Chinda fore

saw the possibility of delaying tactics and informed the Coun
cil that If th© Shantung demands were not met, the Japanese

delegation would not sign the treaty#

After detailed ques

tioning by President Wilson over the Japan#©# operation of th#
leasehold, Chinda and Makino agreed to the President*a inten
tion of hearing the Chinese ease on th# following aftern o o n # ^
The session, with th# Chines# commenced by th# President
reviewing the entire garnet of bino-Japanese relations during
the war years, noting specifically the secret agreements of
1915 end 1918#

Wilson informed th# Peking delegation that he

was unable to gain the acceptance of the Japanese for a fivePower trusteeship over Klaoehow nor the renunciation of the

3 9 paria Peace Conference, V, pp# 109-110#

^°Xbld.. pp. 123-133.

Oi
claims of the Tokyo delegates*

Th© rresldeat went on to

©tat© that while there wei s w

doubt in his mind ova? ta©

validity of th© wartime

its between China and Japan,

wthar© w$ab no doubt whatsoever* as to the agreements entered
into by France and Great Britain#

Mr# H o g wee reminded that

all unjust treatment of China ntmo not by any means bean
confined to Japan.,*1 and that it ^ould not do to Identify jus
it1
tlo& with the unfortunate ©ng©g©:ment3 of thm paat*^

Marquis Salonjt* although not taking a direct part In
the negotiations, wmm becoming impatient over the dalaya in
settling fciie contraveray and dispatched trie following not® t
Olcmenceau:
Mr* President:
The Chiefs of the Government of th©
Great Powera having already heard th# Delegate# of
China on the subject of the question of th© Province
of bhantu&g, I wish to express in the name of the
Jape tie#© Delegation, the desire to see as soon as
peesIbl© a further meeting to expedite tha definitive
settlement of fchia question*
Considering the peculiar Importance of tula qua a*
tlon for Japan, I would be grateful, Hr* President,
if you would keep ua, so far as possible, informed of
all steps in Ifca*furtherance*
Ace opt etc* 1*2
fm

O h in©## decided to submit a four~point proposal

which would be compatible with their national interests and
which read:
%
, <1
ir" P
a ris
P e a c e C o n f.UMelii!
r eIff,n
cmi*,e.*#*«,* ^ V ,
*M4hHWM*-U.lA«* maWMi^— ni—Wm*****
.i
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*
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X# Germany renounces to th® Five Allied and Associa
ted Powers her holdings, rights and privileges in Shan
tung. for restoration to China*
IX* Japan, being in possession of the said holdings,
rights and privileges, engage® to effect the said res
toration to Chine within one year after the signature
of the freaty of Feme® with Germany#
III* China agrees to make a pecuniary compensation
to Japan for the military expenses incurred in the
capture of fsingtao, the amount of the said compensa
tion to be determined by the Council of Four#
IV# China agrees to open the whole of Kiaochow Bay
as «* commercial Fort, and to provide a special quarter,
If desired, for the residence of the cltisens and sub
jects of the treaty powers*43
At th# Council meeting held at the President1® residence
at 6s30 P*M* , on April 25th, th© three Council members review
ed Marquis Salonji*# letter, a report of the committee study
ing the Shantung problem and the statement of the Chinee#
which Incorporated th© four-point proposal*

After reviewing

the documents, it was suggested by Mr* George that someone
should be appointed to sound out the Japanese before they
appeared before th® Supreme Council*

At President Wilson*s

suggestion, both Mr* -George and Mr* Balfour were asked to
visit Baron Makino and Viscount Chinda, however, Mr* Georg®
assigned the task to his Foreign Minister*

Later the same

evening, Wilson discussed the Shantung issue with Mr* Baker
and commented that ?fthey are not bluffers, and they will go

^ Paris Peace Conference,* V, p* 250*
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horn© unless w© give them what they should not h a v e / f^
The Amortcan Chief Executive was deeply disturbed over
the failure to resolve the Shantung problem and on the after*
noon of April 26th* th© President and the four Commissioners
met together to consider the matter*

Three of the Coramis-

sioners* Lansing* White and Bliss* favored holding out a*
gainst the Nipponese demands while Colonel Hone# felt that
such a stand might lead to a Japanese wlthdraw&l from the
|}C
Conference*
Mr* Lansing was asked if h® would visit th#
Japanese delegation in an effort to dissuade them, from their
demands*

Lansing was personally unpopular with th© Nipponese

and th® meeting was not only unsuccessful but quite stormy*
The delegation* in a report to Tokyo* stated that Lansing in
timated that the Japanese might prolong th© retrocession of
Xlaoohoftr or make unreasonable demand-s for compensation*

Lan

sing* according to the Japanese report* went on to say that
11an agreement made under certain overpowering conditions can
not necessarily be recognised as valid,**46

The American Sec

retary of State in recalling this visit states that Viscount
Chinda made it clear that M s

country intended to insist upon

^•Bakar, ££. clt.. IX, p. 253,
Kg
^ Seymour* op* cit* » p* 451*
|i£>
Fifield, "Japanese Policy toward th© Shantung Question
at th© Paris Peace Conference/* pp* 270-272*
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U7
hcr^pound of flesh*1 and the meeting was an. utter failure •'*
Balfour was somewhat more successful in M b

m e e tin g

w i t h Bar on Maklno, and was a b le to

'raft a fo r m u la for the

return of Shantung to the Chines®#

Balfour sumxariaeu M s

report of the visit by stating:
In the first p l a c e , the Japanese strenuously deny
either that they intend to modify in their own favor
the conditions which the Germans had imposed upon
the Chinese in connection with the Shantung Penlnsula, or that, la f a c t , their treaties with China would
havo bad that effect#
They say, on the contrary, that they propose sur
rendering all military control over the Peninsula, in
cluding the 50~kiXomatra son© around Kimochow within
which German troops wars allowed but not Chinese, and
all interference with the civil admi n 1strs. ti on of the
territory* Their intention is fully to restore Chipizese sovereignty within the leased territory,, * .
Wilson express©d n m m d o u b t over th e exact m ean in g of
the Japanese p ro p o s a l and added t h a t "if th© Japanese would
concede a l l m i l i t a r y r i g h t s and x m k e their a g re e m e n t a pure*#
^&O
ly economic one, he would agree to what they desired**?^ /
E-aifour was an thori&ed to eoimourilcat© with the Tokyo delega
tion and in a very conciliatory letter, he commented:
, • * ih© only points on which your colleagues expressed anxiety were th e temporary arran.geman.ts wi th

Robert Lansing, The Peace gapptiatlons (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin, and Co# T92177” p#*~^5i5T""’
^ JBakor,

o p * cl t * , III, p* 311*

1. fy

'+v Paris Peace Corxf eronoo, V , n» 313*
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regard to guarding th® 11ns and garrisoning Bsim.ru
These, as they pointed out* wore not merely Inter
ferences with Chines# sovereignty* but interferences
in excess of anything whicr. the d a m a n s could claim
under their Shantung; arrangements• They hopod you
would consent to di sousa this relatively unimportant ^
aspect of the Shantung proto lam tomorrow at 11 o* clock*"''
Th® day of decision for Hlppon arrived on April Z9th
and the last point in disagreement was the issue of guarding
the Shantung railways.

Chi ml a and Makino took the stand that

since the f o m % v German owners had enjoyed extraterritorialty,
the same provision should apply to the Japanese owners to inelude control over the railway police*
and Mr* Balfour rejected this theory*

Both the President
Mr* Wilson stated that

sine# the Japanese already had control over the Board of Direc
tors* they eould In turn control the appointments to the rail
way police force without requiring such « stipulation in the
Peace Treaty*

Mr# Balfour, who seemed to have the most suc

cess with the Mjllc&do's delegates* stepped into the scene and
told the Japanese that flhe was surprised at the ton© of the
present conversation* and that he understood "that
the inten¥
u or, of Japan was fully to restore Chinese sovereignty within
the leased territory, and only to retain rights which were
economic in. character**^

After considerable discussion

-;,0'::.aker, op, clt,4 III, pp. 312-313.
" P a r i s Peace Conference# V# p. 331*
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over the police issue, Mr, Balfour nada tm

following propo*

sals
X* Tiie declared policy of Japan, is to hand Tuck
to China. in full sovereignty the Shantung Peninsula
and to retain only the economic privileges poeae^ssd
by Germany*
2* Any employment of special police on the rail
way is merely fce give the owners of fee railway aeourity for traffic and will bo used for no other purpose*
3*

Such Japanese Instructors as may be required to

assist in policing the railway may be selected by the
company*v2
fhe meeting adjourned with the two delegates stating that
they w n X d give the proposal their serl ous c c u b icora ti on*

At

6s30 P*M, j, that same day, Mr# Balfour advised the President
fcmt the Wronnoso accepted in substance the draft of the amendmerits*

Wilson returned a note to Balfour giving hie final

re-wording of the amendment*

Th® formula, ms approved by tha

Council and the Tokyo delegation reads
X* The policy of Toper is to hand back the Shan
tung Peninsula ix* full sovereignty to Chirm ro twining
only the economic privileges granted to Germany and
the rlt$it to establish a, settlement under the usurl
conditions at Telngtao*
2* The owners of the hallway will use the special
police only to ensure security for traffic* They will
be used for no other purposes*
3*
The Police Force will be composed of Clunsse,
and such Japanese instructors as the Directors of the
Hallway may ^elect will, be ■appointed by the Chinese

Gove rumen t*^*>

safa r is

Peace € o n fp ro n o a » V ,

5^ibid*# p* 363*

p* 335#
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The last steps for the settlement of the Shantung con-*
trover cy wore taken on April 30th*

K&klno and Chine!a felt

that their countries should receive reimbursement for the ex**
penaes involved In keeping between ii-,000 and 5,000 'reman
prlHonors-of-war*

This cost Mas unilateral since only a very

fms Japanese were captured by the Germans*

After Mr* George

explained that If Japan put In such a claim, other nations
would want o.1mlliar considerations, Maklno replied that he
would net press the issue*

Tha final step involved was the

presentation of tha draft of the Articles fox* Incorporation
into the Treaty concerning the disposition of tha German
rights and property in Klaoohow*

Th© Japanese draft became

the basic for Articles 156 and 13? of tha Treaty of Ver„
5ix
Bailie©#' 4
Th® Shantung settlement caused great consternation &~
mong th© Chinese delegation and in fact, China later refused
eje*
to sign th© Treaty*
Be act! or* against President Wilson was
equally hitter and th© American proas by large, cond ©timed him
for giving in. to tha Tokyo delegation#

Wilson felt that the

settlement was the bast that could be obtained under the c i r 
cumstances and expressed the hop© that the League of nations

•P
„
-*PflfleiG* jg£* cl t» * p» 2b 2*
c'r*
'"••'■'WOOQ, o p * cl i * # p, 21*

94
would mediate tho abrogation of all foreign ri*£its and Intoreata In China.'*0

A further source of friction botwoon the United States
and Japan arose over the little island of Zap*

This ieland,

located in the Carolines, was the center for the German cable
to the Dutch Bast Indies# Shanghai and Guam*

Through Guam,

th# cable connected with th# American*owned Pacific cubic
which provided a comsiunic & ti on network to the United States
and across the Atlantic to the Gorman cable system*

By con-

trolling Zap, the Japanese could virtually tie up all common- 1
1
Icationa to the Orient*
On April 21at and ©gain on May 1st,
Wilson made oral x*#aeinraliens that Zap should not be included
in the Japanese Mandate*

Nevertheless, the Japanese were

awarded s mandate over the former German islands north of the
equator on Hay ?th and lap was not excepted from the Mandate*
Tlxer# is a Iso not any official record tlxat the President made
an object!on at trio time of the award*

This controversy con

tinued until it was finally resolved st the Washington Con
ference -In l0rZ2.J^
In summary, the Japanese nation fared quite well at
the Purls Peace Conference.

Although the demand for racial

■^Dairor, 0£. clt*. III, pp* 31?-316.
r**7
** Paris Peace Conference, V, pp. 506-508| Quincy Wriy#it,
Mandates ^uTer the^Te ague of Hit! ons (Chi c a go i The Uni varsity
go'~T r e a a , ™19.J?JT7pp ♦ 1r3 — «
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equality to b© included as a provision in the Treaty was not
met, Nippon gained her other two objectivesj continued con
trol over the Islands which ah© occupied and the transfer of
the German leasehold in Shantung*

CHAPTER VI
THE WASHINGTON CCNFEHEKCE
The Peris Peace Conference left unsolved many Issues
arising out of the World War,

One of the great areas of

tension was in the Orient where neither China nor Japan was
entirely satisfied with the post-war developments.

The Chi

nese delegation refused to sign the Versailles Treaty and
left Paris an route to Peking with the firm conviction that
their country had been abandonee to the whims of the Japan
ese,^

The Tokyo delegation returned home flushed with vic

tory, having gained all of the desired objectives except for
that of having racial equality written into the Covenant of
the League of Nations#

The Kaaumlgaaeki, or Japanese Foreign

Office, had to face equally vexing probl&^m in the immediate
post-war period#

Tokyo *s relations with Washington had rap

idly deteriorated over the PIberian Intervention,

the Shan

tung settlement, and the mandate of the island of Tap •^

A

new source of irritation and a blow to the Japanese pride
arose over the question of restriction of immigration to the
United States#

The news of alien land laws and other meas

ly ood, o£# clt#, p p • 1,35-137•
^Latouretto, op, cit,, pp# 320-521*

uree directed a g & ln s t i no Japanese in California inc©nsed
the Kippones© newspapers to almost hysteric©! proportions
and served to foster an t .1~&zmr loan fool Inga*

3.

Gelations bo tween London and Tokyo were also Lai rig re-

vali’.a ted •

The Japanese military, polit ic a l and industrial

favored renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance w h i c h

leaders

bad br o ug ht theft p a r t i e Ipafcicm in the war* a st aunch ally in
the peace ■negotiations and

East*

Britain,

international pr es ti g e in the Far

on the other hand, viewed the fo rthcoming r e 

newal w i t h hi xed feel !ng«u
n avy

tilppon, w i t h the third large at

In the world was a l r e a d y c h a l l e ng in g B r i t i s h spheres of

influence in Chin© and Jstoglepd1$ benefits froft the hiXlance
w ere by no means o o m e n © urate to thoee gained by her p a r t 
n e r*

Mr* Lloyd G eorge* w h ile aware o f America* 3

o v e r B r i t i s h o b lig a tio n s
B a it e d S t a t e s

in

anxiety

th e e v e n t o f a w a r b e tw e e n th e

and Japan* d e c id e d

In favor o f re n e w a l and

g r a d u a l l y won ©11 of the Dominion .Brim© M in is t e r s

to his

v ie w p o in t except Mr* Jan Mnuia o f Mouth A f r i c a who favored a
r e v is io n

o f th e J ro & ty and 4r* Arthur ^Seighen o f Gan&da who

p rop osed outright a b r o g a tio n and p la c e d Genad© a t th e side
1
o f the Gultad Btates.** In an effort t o allay the suspicion

ton:

^ o r e L * halations of the United it©tec. 1920 {hashingo* g*
n u m 3 9 a t greeting office, I 9 3 & ) * XI i, pp. 17-13.
h
‘nlaymond L* Buell,

The Wa sh in g t o n Goafar©nee

(Kew Fork:

J. Appleton and Qo., 192£)7V."lZgi" S a w S i a T o b T elt.. p. £ 9 0
«.■■• -.a• •
..
'
•red ncr , *o&n&u«& * tne

a

ng 1o—J© p m las o alliance aim tu©

W a s h i n g t o n C o n f e r e n c e , H I oil t leal do tenge Q u a r t e r l y , L

1935}# p. 33.

**" "

“
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of the United States and Canada, the two Alliance nations
Presented a Joint declaration to the League of nations in
Which, they recognized that the Treaty, while In *harmony”
with the spirit of the League, was not entirely consistent
with the letter of the Covenant*

The declaration went on t©

say that if the Alliance was renewed by the two partners, it
must be In a form consistent with the Covenant***
The most vexing post-war defense problem to Japan was
the naval construction race*

The Havel Service Appropriation

Act of 1916 embarked the United States on an ambitious build
ing program which would give America a naval fleet second to
f
none*0 The Japanese Government planned an neight-eight” con
struction program of eight battleahlpa and eight battle cruis
ers but, for reasons of economy, the project was reduced in
1916 to eight battleships and four cruisers#

Later, in 1919,

the Tokyo Government, following the lead of Washington and
London, reinstituted the original plan*^
Following the war and peace provisions, sentiments de
veloped In London and Washington for a reduction in the shlp-

^Raymond L# Buell, The Washington Conference {Hew York:
Dm Appleton and Co*, 1922), pp*' 152-133*
.^Benjamin H* Williams, The Uni ted States and Pi sarmaraent (Hew Yorks HeGraw-Hill BooE Co*,"1neT7 T§3ll# PP* T33-336,
^Ichihaaki Yaraoto, The Washington Conference and After
(Stanford University; S t a n J K ^ ^ H I ’v e r s l % " ,Tf?^aJ’"X9s
2 BTr p* If*

b u ild in g

program of toe throe nations a only Ha a ut a tautlaXly

reduced*

In eimiliar' vain, Lord Lae of Faren&m, ^’irat ford

o f tm

Admiralty, cage®ated a naval understanding with the

United 0 bates on bus baa Is of parity*

A

The White House announced on July 10th that the Gov
ernments of Great Hr 1tala, Japan, France and Italy had been
approached to ascertain whet tier or not they would be willing
to participate in a conference to consider limitation of
arm ament and th e prob lem s

o f th e ^ a r f a s t and th e

taolflo*

Tlie a d d i t i o n of the latter element was In c lu d e d by £earotary
o
C h a rle s o# Hughe® a t th e s u g g e s tio n o f L o rd C u rzo n * / A c tu 
a lly
tiv e s

fu r s o n w anted a p rc X l.n l n a ry m e e tin g b e tw e e n r e p r e s e n t a 
o f London, Tokyo and W a s h in g to n I n

ordex* to

p re p a re an

agenda b u t le e r e b a r y Hughes was adam ant and d e c la r e d t h a t he

ruled o a t fi a moot trig which w ou ld partake o f the nature o f a
■If)

p r e l i m i n a r y ocmfe-rtmc©**'

This was fo llo w e d by for.'.'.ml lnvl«

tations to Tokyo and other Interested gavernuants ana which
w are e x te n d e d by I r e s I dent H a rd in :' on A u gu st X I , 19X1* IX

Nippon viewed such wide discusslonw with great auapl«

n delations o f the U n ite d ft*t*s, 1921 (Waehino
lovov nm n t Xrtntlug Office, 1936), I, p* dj*
“ —

ton:

-— -— —

--------- -

***•<*» ,w.*»mWit.tfWW.tnH.

-

Griswold, op* alt#, op* 293-296*
iu?oFe Ign Ac la t Iona of the United Ota tea, 1921, I, pp. id.

47*

el on*

Serne newspaper* declared that the conference invita

tion cheated a national orials*

While the lies of an a w *

mont reduction program gained. rsady aoeept&ncs by the Japan
ese public* the inclusion of Far Eastern and Peelfie affaire
urns not considered as a logical approach by the Japanese mind*
Tn& Foreign Ministry tealtatad In. accepting ffarte blenohe
fcte inofunion of dissuasion of far Baateam matters until "pare*
cicely Inf © m o d of the nature and scope of tiiem problems*11
Secretary Hughes thereupon decided to sound out the views? of
Lord Cur a on i he particularly wanted to tmc&r whether any sug
gestion af topics had a Ira a %

been made in Tokyo*

C u n on re

plied that he thought that the conference should be limited

to di souse ion of the 1,1open door,11 the territorial integrity
of China, Shantung* mud wlosseJ territory in and around the
Pacific Ocean**

The British wanted to eliminate from the dis

cussion such tm% tore at opium traffic, immigration, *pesses«
slons of Germany In the Pacific,* (i*e*, mandated areas}, and
the integrity of Russia,*^

itughea thereupon advised the Japan

ese Government of the general nature of the topics but held
off on pro paring a definite agenda, expressing the hope that
the Japanese Government *would net press Its inquiry in this

matter because of the desirability of complete acceptance
of thim Government* a lnvi tat ion, leaving open to later do#*
termination the exact agenda/’^*

Tokyo reluctantly agreed

to attend the Cenferenea with this qualification that 91the
agenda thereof should be arranged In accordance with the
main object of the discussions as above defined, and that
introduction therein of problems such as are of sole concern
to certain particular power® or such matters that mmj be re
garded accomplished facto should be scrupulously avoided#^®
Hlppon9* dileiKia was expressed in the following article
which c ons&en ted s
* * , the tone of the Japanese press indicated that
the invitations had come as somewhat of a shock*
The
outstanding difficulties between Japan and the United
State®, involving the Conference issue; the objection
of the United States to the Pacific mandates north of
the kquator accorded Japan by the Peae& Conference,
especially as regard a the cable rights of Yap; the
disapproval of Japan*s policy toward China and Siberia,
and the alleged tendency of the 'United states to en
courage the Chinese in their anti-Japanese campaign-all these, complicated by mutual distrust and the in
crease of naval armaments on both sides, made President
Harding*a Invitation a not altogether agreeable sur
prise far Japan# # « .16
The delegation selected by the government to travel
to Washington consisted of Havy Minister Baron {and Admiral)
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Kate" Xtt&oaahurof

ilmxm of

Peers Pres i d e n t Prtnee Tokugawa |

A m b a s s a d o r to the Uni tad States* B a r o n Shi de here Kijurof
Viee Foreign Minis ter Eanih&ra Ma s arm*

The d e l e g a t i o n was

eeeompenied by over seventy legal# military* technical and
administrative assistants*

Prince Tofcugawa later commented

that the delegation was not equal in education and experience
to that of ntm® of the other leading p o w e r s . ^
The basic ins true ti one to the delegation were prepared

by the Gaiko Choeakal end provided that:

(1)

I'llpp on is pr#*

pared to -accept a c u r t a i l s fit of h er naval armament as long

as the national security Is not Impaired thereby;

(2)

She

has no establishments in the Pacific 'Which threaten the ae*
curity of other nations nor did she intend to make any; (3)
She was prepared to conclude an agreement to abolish all mil*
itary and naval establishments in the Pacific that would
threaten Hie peace and would abandon the military construe*
fcion already started;

(if.)

open door policy to lap;
would also apply to China*

Japan was ready to extend the
(5 )

the principle of the open door

£6 )

the Shantung issue would on*
1 A.
ly be discussed by direct negotiation with China.
By September 10* 1921# the United States ikyvernment

had prepared the draft of an agenda which was later approved

17
'Yanaga* op. cit*, p. 419# citing Tokugawa Xyes&to.
*K&fvL Kaigi ni tariurtTTbron,'1 Talyo* (March# 1922)# pp. 98*99.
i9 Tak«uohi, o£. olt.. p. 233.
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by tha nation* attending the me©ting subject to the qua Ilf I*
fter&iou that additional Items isight be introduced:

I*

Li&iitation of Neval k tm azmn tf under which ahali

be discussed:
a*
o•
e*

Basis of limitation*
-.U.t’©n v *
FulTi X listent *

11# Buies for control of new agencies of warfare.
T i l . Liiai t a il on of iBiid armament*

I’AOX.*, „U> iW.f i
X*

W*‘j*g,W-ilW-X*

questions relating W China*
1* f M n e i p l e e to be applied*
2* Application*
ft• ferrltori el Into grity*
b* Adminietrs live Integrity,

e*
d*

Open door— equality of ec on orJ.c and indue trial opportunity*
Coneassic n s 9 monopolies, or preferential
economic privileges*

a*
f*
g*
XX*
XXI*

Development of railways* Including plans
relating to Chinese hastern Railway,
Preferential railroad rates*
Status of existing eoasml ttmanta.

31 barIu ( airulliisr headings)
htiivlated I elan do ( Ciacuetsi on of those quests ons

not settled by earlier discussions)*

ShhCOTCAl. COMmttCATIOHS Iff TEE PACIFIC
A discussion of unsettled questions involving
the nature and ©cope of corarai tteacn ts underQ
which claims of rights mifilht b e ««tar tad*

lo
X curere no o on the Limits &L >,< of ,.r'nsoaui,
:<ovcinber x f » Ihcl - Dobrusry 6, Xxu.<. (Washington:
'JnivO > w*
^V,“
r01tlnp ■Crf F C o ¥ r i ^ 2 X T T w^ 10*
Ho rc af to r o*.t#d as

^ojifereoce on the Limitation of Armament) *
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The opening session began on November 12, 1921, with
Mr* Charles Evans Hughes pr@ai.ding*

President Harding offi

cially we 1 coxaed the delegates an! then left the hall, turn
ing the meeting over to his Secretary of State*

Hr* Hughes

then launched Into & speech which was marked by the absence
of the platitudes and generalities usually presented In an

opening session*2 ®

Hr* Hughes went directly into the heart

of the matter by presenting a proposal for- the limitation of

armaments and designed:
* . • the core of hie difficulty is to be found
in the competition in naval programs, and that In
order appropriat©ly to limit naval armament, com
petition in Its production m u s t be abandoned. * . *
Thore la only one adequate way and that is to end
It now.
It l a apparent that this ca n n o t bo accomplished
without serious sacrifices* Enormous sums have b o o n
©rporido I upon ship a under c o n s t r u c t i o n and building
program® which era n o w under wa y cannot be given up
withoui heavy loss,
bet if the present construction
of capital ships goes forward, other ships will in
evitably be built to r i val them and this will lead
to others*
Thxm the race will continue so long as
ability to continue lasts*
ihe effort to escape
sacrifices la futile. W © must face them or yield
our purpose*4-!
Mr* Hughes went on to state that "it would also seem to be a

vital p a r t of g plan for the limitation of naval armament

2vI»s.bcoi^tts | o£* ci t» . p. S>2 2 .
21
Conference on the Himl tation of Armament* p. 5d*
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that there should be a naval holiday,

it is proposed that

for a period of not later than ten years, there should be no
22
further construction of capital ships.” "
The Secretary al
so detailed the s p e c i f i c

kvmvlean, feri11sh and Japanese ships

that should be scrapped.

The entire assembly hall %ms elec

trified by the sweeping proposals presented in such an un
expected and dramatic manner.

Sullivan states that Admiral

Beatty of the British Navy 11came forward in his chair with
the manner of e bulldog sleeping on e sunny porch who had
been hit in the stomach by th e f o o t of an 1 t Am*x*ant v o u p cinveeser *M^

Another writer states that the Japanese took Mr*

Hughes1 speech "without the flicker o f an. eye,” while Current
History* to the contrary, described the Nipponese as " sur
prise
The first agreement concluded at the Conference was
the Four Bower Pact, the terms of which were announced to
the press on December 10th*

22*.

The xiewapapers and indeed, many

Arms Conference in Action,
No. 3 (December, 1921), pp* xxx-xl.

H

Current History, XV

^^Williams, o p . cit., p. iWi* citing Mark. Sullivan,
Tbs Great Advantage at Washington (Hew York:
Doubleday,
Pag© and CoTT^T^SsT, pp. 2/-2B.
^Williams, o p . cit,, p. 114*., citing Ida M. Tar be 11,
Peacemakers-Blessed and Otherwise (Hew far*:
The KacmilIan
C o 1922 57 pTTJ5; Current His fcory. XV, o p . c i t *. p. x x .
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of the delegates wore taken by surprise nine© the matters
2*~j
cohered in the Fact were not In eluded in the agenda*
U®*»
gotiuiione between Britain and to# Uniy-ed states began on
the evening prior to toe first couf e x e u o e session*

then two

of the Japanese delegates called upon Hr# Balfour to discuss
the- renewel of too /.nglo-Jepane*a Alliance, Balfour dumbfoiniosd them by telling toe delegate® that be was oonsi dering

the replacement cf the Alliance with a tripartita agreement
and had already given too Uni ted States Government a draft of
swc'a a proposal# *"'
Seer#tery ZIughe© wanted to broaden the Fact to Include
Franco#

Thm iU&erlcans wanted to win Franc# over to accepting

hex* nave 1 ratio and also felt it desirable to generalize the
responslb*11 ties mrnmr tou fruaby*

uhlX® neither Britain nor

Japag wanted to include rsris on the grounds that it would
dilute tho of * o c ft.fi.v s M S i ox to^ faot9 by beeember 7 ton both
nations agroto to pormlt too fourth member ta enter Into to#

P7

nbgct'i oti one* '*f

in too meantime, x taiy learned of too meet

ings and stood tost too be included* however. Bushes turned
down tto xiog„:.xoi on the ground & tout the Berne Government did

" Jonn Chalmers Vinson, The jtorohmant Peace * (Athens;

Tkm University of G e o r g ia F r a s W T 7'P P * ^ 5 2 •
26Ich± haah!,
cit., n, 121 .
* 4op.
tWW*'v*.
«»'**'»»##*■#. ^
27ibia.
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not h&v« possessions in the Orient*

pA

The final discussions

pertaining to the Four-* Power Treaty took place in the hom®
of Secretary Hughes on December Sth and 9th*

At the first

of those meetings* Baron Shidehant proposed an emendfoent
which provided that two or the powers could *in mutual a~
greemont with each other^ invite the regaining contracting
parties to a joint conference*
Hippo no m

Hughes auaptoiened that tna

were using this as a means to continue the Anglo**

Japanese Alliance and declared that this proposal was not
acceptable**^

%

the term* of Artie it 'X of the Treaty, the four na

tions agreed to nrespect their rights in relation to their In*
aular puuaasalona and Insular dominion* in the region of the
Pacific Ocean*"

They would further consult If there should

develop Ma qqxiiravoray arising out of any Pacific question
and Involving the!r laid rights*11 Article XI provided that
the Powers would, In the event of a threat by an outside
Power* ooiOTunioat® Kith ©me another fully ana frankly In or*
dor to arrive at an understanding ms to the most efficient
measures to be taken* Jointly or separately* to meet the ex*

^Xehlhftofcl* o£> elt** p* 121*
29

'Vinson* on. cl t »* ;o* 156*

lo8

lg.nei.st of th« particular situation.3*' Japan fall Into the
category of an insular possession under the terms of the
Treaty end many Japanese took it as an affront tha t the Trea
ty wshould be Interpreted aa obligating the ether eor.tracting
parties to extend even a moral assistance to the safeguarding
of the territorial Integrity of Japan proper*n 3X

The Treaty

was later amended to do fine Japan* s insular possessions to
include "only Karafuto* Formosa* the Pescadores and the is
lands under the Mandate of J a p a n U n d e r Article IV, the
Anglo-Japanese Alliance was terminated* and thus a greet
source of concern to the united States was removed.

Senator

Lodge, In summarising the effect of this termination declared
that It "was necessary to the successful conclusion of the
navel t r e a t y The Nipponese delegation* obviously not

happy over the outcome, dismissed the announcement of the
now work with a brief statement that Japan would approve the
treaty and that the Anglo-J&p&ne a# Alliance "had done much
*t

for the preservation of peace and liberty*®-

3 € xraatlas and fteaolotions of the Conference on the Lim
its fcion of Arms me n tPT N aw Yorks
Federal Trade*~Tn?ormetion Serv
ice, 1922T* "ppl
»
Yorks

^ X i y o s h l K. Kawakaml* Japan* g Pacific Policy (New
E.T. Dutton and. Co., 1922), ’pT £5"!
~

3^Trea ties and Hesolutions of the C onference on the bimi ta 1i on of A rma mer. t * u . 29 •
33Ichih*shi, oc, cit.. p. 13?.
3P r b i d . . p. 136.
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The negotiations for a r r i v i n g at armament limitations
comm©need

on Uovember 1 9th w i t h a meeting between l-fr* Hughes,

Baron IC&to and Mr* B&lfour*

3aron Kato suggested that naval

experts ffo-i tns bares countries fores. a aub-c o.unittee to e x 
amine toe American proposal of a >- 3 ~ 3 ratio of capital

ships*

This co;&mitte-e was composed of Admiral Goonts and

Captain Pratt for the 'Jriltal States; Admiral Beatty and Hear
A d m i r a l Chetflaid for Britain;

flea A d m i r a l Kato and C a p t a i n

tfyeda for J a p a n . the group had no aoonex* met than it b e 
came deadlocked over tha issue of tha ratio and A d m i r a l K&fc’o
issued the following public statement on Movemb©r £3th!

Owing to her geographical situation and to her
peculiar national conditions, the imperative need
of a navy is recognised by Japan in no leas degree
than by any other c ouritry; but Japan is resolved
not to possess orntamtmts in excess of the minimum
strength for the bare necessity of insuring her
national security*
Japan is unable to accept the
ratio of 60 per cent, because so.@ considers it in**
possible to provide for her security and defense with
any fore© less than 70 per cent.
Hats desires to
have the proposed ratio modified so that the relative
strength of the tore© navies will be 1 0 - 1 0 -?#

Mr. Balfour later called upon Baron Kato and expressed
his disappointment that Japan could not agree with the pro-

3 f’Xehihashi, pp. a l t * , p. %?.
3h

o Id.,- 3 . i*8 .

1X0

posed retie and hoped that some wmy could be found to contin
ue the negotiations end arrive at a settlement*
asked Kato*

Balfour

if he had any mrggestlexia In which, moons could bo

found to reconcile the difference**

The Baron replied that

he could not act contrary to the considered opinion of his

advisors nor against his government's wishes, however, he
would do the best he- could to break the deadlock*

Ha to* went

on to say that his country would ilk# to see the “Settau*
substituted for the

*Matsu* which was scheduled to be scrap

ped in the proposal

submitted by the Americans* Kato also

ex-

pressed the desire of an agreement concerning the Pacific
fort!f■
i cation# ^
The following day, in a meeting with the other m e m b e r s
of the *Slg T h r e e , 11 the T o k y o deleg a t e r e i t erated his deal re
f e r a 1 0 - 1 0 -? ratio

by deelaringt

A word as to the r?ffutsu*rl She was c ompleted a
m o n t h a g o and is fu lly equipped and manned*
She w as
commissioned y o s t e r d a y and has Joined tha fleet*
But according to the A m e r i c a n proposal she Is in the
list of ships to be scrapped* I m a s t have good r e a s o n s
for scrapping her* I face a situation at once serious
and difficult] on# on# hand, I desire a h a m o n l o u s
conclusion on the limitation] and. on the other hand, I
must be equipped with reasons which will enable me to
explain to the s a t i s f a c t i o n of Japan. So far, X h a v e
been unable to find any means w h e r e b y mutual satisfac
tion can b® obtained*

^ X ohlhashi,

op*

oit** p* I4.9#

Ill
However, I said yesterday to Hr* Balfour, should
it foe- possible for the Powers situated In tha Pacific,
particularly the United States and Japan, to maintain
the status quo ©n their Pacific fortifications and
navaT^aeeaj 'liiat would give xm reason to satisfy the
Japanese p e o p l e *38

Hr* Balfour followed by declaring that Orest Britain was not
entirely satisfied with the rati© either, but that M e

coun

try was willing i© accept with, the desires of other states in
an attempt for further disarmament*

The committee did not

meet again until D e c e m b e r 12th at W h i c h time Ka t e reported
that hm received Instructions from his Government In which
lippon would accept a 1 0 - 1 0 - 6 rati© provided that there was a
clear u n d e r s tending that the Powers,tIncluding Japan), would
maintain the status quo of the Pacific fortifications.
continued M s

Rato

Oovernment1® instructions by advising that toe

w-a was already 100$ ecmpXsted and In fact had made her
first ©rule© of over 2,500 illea*

Tim delegate

argued

that

the Japanese people would not understand the r e a s o n for scrap

ping a Ship that was already eomrslssloxied and that It would be
a b l o w to the moral® of the Japanese Havy*

However, it would

be possible to scrap the Settsu as a substitute*^

Mr* Hughes

countered Rato’s proposition by declaring that the subatltu-

Ichi ha chi, op* c i t ** pp* 50-51.
3 9 X M d .. pp.

52-?3.
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tlon of a post-Jutland type ship would upset toe entire plan
since it would mmmi that America would want to be compensated
with aiwillar appropriate imhatlfcutiona*

In line with this,

HUghea later proposed that the United States 'keep to# Califor
nia end Washington and replace those ships with to# Horto Da
kota and to® Delaware which in tonnage would amount to fifteen
Amerlcan ships to nine of the- Japanese, with a maximum limita
tion of 3 5# D00 tons eaeh**^

It was now toe turn for Britain to make her claim and
Balfour proposed that England retain toe two # Super-Hoods”
of 50,000 tons each.

Balfour Justified this action on the

grounds that the plans had already been drawn and if substi
tution of style imn required, new plans would take over a. year
to a c c o m p l i s h * ^

A compromise agreement was finally reached

on December 15th In which Great Britain was allowed to scrap
four "King George V” typo ships and build two "Super-Hood a*
of 35,000 ton© each*.

Even at this, Great Britain would have

a total of 587,000 tons of capital ship# against >25,000 far
the United States*

Finally, both the Uni.ted State# and Great

Britain were limited to 525,000 replacement tonnage while

^ X o h l l m s h l , o£, © i t ** p* 55*
4 l2 M l « »

p

» 56.
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Japan wmm allowed 3151000*

Tha agreements concerning Franc©

ami Italy arc not of particular slgnifl cane a to this thesis,
however, after extended n e -*50tiation®f both France and I taly
agreed to a limitation of ten capital ahlpa with the replace
ment tonnage eatabllahed at 1 ? 5 , 0 0 0 * ^

Agreement a were also

reached limiting the else of Aircraft Carrlera to 10,000 tons j
regulating the

of submarines In the attack of commercial

ships and a prohibition against the us© of noxious gases

The agreements concerning the status quo of naval for
tifications and bases In the Pacific provided:
The United State®, the British Umpire and Japan

agree that the status quo at the time of the sign
ing of the present treaty* with regard to fortifica
tions and naval bates, shall be meintainei in their
respective territories and post©salon® specified
hereundert

1* The Insular possessions which the United States
now holla or may hereafter acquire In the Pacific
Ocean, except (a) those ad jacent to the coast of the
Uni ted *&tes, Alaska, and the Panama Canal 2 one , not
Xncludt ^ the Aleutian Islands, and (b) the Hawaiian
Ialanda*
2* Hongkong and the insular possessions .which the
z*ri tiah. Empire ’now hold a or may .hereafter a c q u i t in
the Pacific Ocean, east of the Meridian of 110 degrees
east lengtitude, except (a)
those adj&cent to the
coast of Canada, Cb)
the Commonwealth of Australia
and it# territories, and ( c)
Sew Zealand*
3* The following Insular territories and possessions
of Japan in the Pacific Ocean, to wits the Kuril* Is
land a, tha Bonin I ©lands, Araami - Oahlma, the booohoo

42rTreaties and hasolutions of ftbe Conference on the
Li mi ta tie:
sament

1*3ibid., pp* 22-26.

Islands, Formosa, and the Pescadores, and any in
sular territories or possessions in the Pacific
Ocean which J&o&n
may
hereafter acquire
•
>
ji
•»
i
In addition to the written agreement, the Favera agreed to
apply the status quo to Guam, the Philippines, Hongkong,
|

<M

AuauI**OshIa&, the Boolna, Formosa, and the Pescadores
Tue terras of the Treaty were especially significant
to Japan sinea the nearest base where the United Dt&tes
could strengthen her existing fo.rtifieafcions was Hawaii, &
distance of over 3,000 miles to Tokyo*

at the a&me time,

Japan wan secure from an attack by Great Britain*

This pro

vision, together wItU the armament limitation program gave
Tokyo a reasonable degree of eeeurlfcy and Baron fCato, In a
speech before the Japan society of Bow fork summarised his

Joveruneat’s viewpoint:
1 think it is possible fox* me to say with reason
able certainty that the Conference on Disarmament has
succeed** d beyond the hope a of those who called It
Into being, and* in this connection, I nave in mind
your great Presideat, was a&nf done no much far this
cause of internatioaal peace*k%>

One of the most serious problems at the Conference
concerned the settlement of tha Issues involving Chirm and

^ T r e a ties. and Be solutions of the Conference on the
L Ini tat loo of A r m m e n t ' T pp**"Tca^lj* ~~ * *
■

1X;J

her strainad fixations with Japan.

Indeed, ireaidant Hording

commented that "thare existed with regard to the Far East
causes of mi aunderstanding and sources of aontraveray which
constituted a eertoaa potential danger*

The so difficulties

centered prIncIpally about China., where the developments of
the peat quarter of a century had produce<1 a situation In
which international rivalries,

Jealousies# distrust, and an-

ta.||onl« were Teetered*"^?
The Toledo dale atlon did not went to deal with any
n a tte rs

that were already a f a i t

a c c o m p li*

Japan however,

had made several overtures f u r settlement o f the Shantung
p r oblem and made several proposals to the Seltlnn g o v e rnment

IlB
for the opening of direct negotiations* *'

China did n o t want

to open direct talks on the feme la that it Implied a form of
recognition of Japan’s status In the peninsula*

China’s bar

gaining position was already weakened by the prestige of Japan,
gained during the naval arma limitations discussions and pub
lic opinion somewhat ofcarsged In favor of Nippon*
China hoped to gain three oonoeeetonst

nevertheless,

tariff autonomy, tha

return of Shantung and cancellation of the Twenty-One ,De-

b-7
* s . H* J a w , Inteyaa.t.lpnal gelatlone Since the i'ew#
Treaties (Londons ilacmHIin and 'Co. ^Tj8s377 op.'*TSiJ-TSy
Wood, op* oit*, pp. 220«*23&,

mands#4*^

*3.6

The tariff concession!? granted to the European Sonora
and iippoia .had long worked & disadvantage to tha Chinas#
Gove rnment#

Sine a tha signing of tha treaty of lank trig of

X % 2 § China had boon raqui.rod to limit her tariff to 5% ad
valorem rat# on both imports and exports*

While It «a®

originally agreed that this tax would b# modified c o m ^ n s u *
rat# to tho rise and fall of prices# there ware no revieions
bet%reen the years 1853 and 1902# and between. 1902 and 1918*50
Yet the? Power# did not he#Ifcabe to set their tariff rat# for
Imports at from Z$% to 100$ ad valorem#

fn addition, Coins

had a tax in the amount of 2§$ which was collected by trie
various provincial g o v # m o r s for all goods pasting in transit#
This tax or likin weakened China*® oaae tine© Great Britain,
the United states and Japan agreed in 1902 and 1903 to pay a
l£f$ ©us to ait fee If the Ilk In was abolished#

This was never

accomplished and her net return was decreasing with cash
rise in prices
Br* Eoo presented a request for tax revision to the
Council on Hoveaber 23, 1921, proposing a 1E|S duty and

**%uell# op* cit* # ppm 21^2~2qS*
£GIbid., 21.2-3*3.

Abolition of the Xlkln.

The matter

mass

referred to a sub-

C o m i t too which x^corsasended an Xnorecee of 2|# which could
bo Inc remind

for luxury goods.

Ao ambiguous provision

was included la the Treaty which was signed on February 22,
1922, and provideds
"within three months, a special Conference shall
meet in China to tax# Immediate ctepe . . * to pre
pare the way for tb& abolition of t*ie Ilk in tax and
raising tha tariff to 12| per cent* • T T 5 ^
Khile this was not considered a satisfactory settlement by
China,

It nevertheless represented a marked improvement*
Kith reference to the shantung is .sue, it «*&« useless

for Peking to bring tha matter before the Conference since
six out of nine rowers already adhered to the- Treaty of Ver
sailles*

The way was opened for negotiations between the two

hostile countries when the British and Auerloan delegations
proposed that they furnish observers who would sit In on the
talk:: tiiu Insure that Chins was not Intimidated by Japan*

The faking delegation agreed to this proposal on h'oveuber
30th.

The main points at issue wore the disposition of Jap

anese property (Including the former Oernan holdings)* and
control over the ?slngtAO-?9ln*nfu Jallroad*

This line had

been valued at ■?,32,000*000 silver dollars sad her many was
credited with this amount in her reparation account*

The

118
Peking delegation agreed to pay this amount in a meeting held
on December l^th, provided that Japan would then immediately
relinquish control.

The Tokyo group rejected this offer

and proposed that China borrow the money from Japan, repay
ing it back over a period of twenty years.

They further

proposed that Nipponese experts be assigned the positions of
Chief Engineer, Chief Accountant and Traffic Manager.

China

made a counter-offer of furnishing Treasury Notes which would
r
be payable over a twelve year period.
This was unacceptable
to Japan and the delegation now proposed that China make a
cash payment with the purchase price to be paid in Mexican -;
!
dollars and deposited in a neutral bank.

To this, China

suggested that payments be mad© ©very three months over a nine
month period.

This was rejected and the conference adjourned

sine die on December 20, 1921.

Negotiations reopened on

January 5th only to break up again the following day over a
53
simlXl&r deadlock.
k compromise settlement was hastened by the news that
United State® Senator Walsh introduced a resolution calling
upon the President to furnish information as to the state of
St
the Shantung negotiations. ^ The Japanese war© aware of the

53Sue 1 1 , o p . c l t .. pp. 2 5 5 - 2 6 0 .
5 ttibld.,

p. 2 6 1 .

fact that tha Senate would hardly ratify tha Maval Treaty
If an agreement could not be found concerning Shantung*

In

a final &gr#©manfc, China waa to pay Japan trie assessed val
uation of tha railroad witvi Treasury Kotos which might be
spread over a fifteen year period*

Public propertiea eon-

atrue tod by Japan wore also to be reimbursed by China with
the provision that no paysent was to be made for former Car
man property*

This was later followed by an m g t m m m n t to

withdraw all Japanese troops from the Tsingfcao-fsinanfu
railroad zonm and by hay 4 th* all Nipponese troops had been
withdrawn*'*3*
China* on December 14th, submitted her demand for the
abrogation of the Treaties of 1915# (based upon the TwentyOne Demand®}•

The Taking delegate cited the constant stand

that the treaties were not legally recognised by China since
they were unilateral and inconsistent with the principles of
the Conference*

The Japanese* In a conciliatory move* a-

greed to withdraw her reservation for later negotiations of
Croup V of the demands» (miscellaneous demands)* and also
agreed to forsake the question of furnishing Japanese ad
visors or instructors on political# military or police met**
tars in south Manchuria*

After China .reserved the right
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for future action, the matter m s

dropped on February k*

Secretary Hughes Introduced the question of the ‘’Open
D o o r” p o l i c y

o n J a n u a ry X 6 th b y o f f e r i n g

a 4 r * f t r e s o lu tio n

which r e a d in part:
W it h a v ie w to a p p ly in g m ore e f f e c t u a l l y tha
p r i n c i p l e of the o p e n 4 o o r o r e q u a l i t y o f o p p o r 
tunity for tha trad# and Industry of all n a t lo r a t ,
t h e p o w e r# r e p r e s e n t e d in t h i s c o n fe r e n c e a g re e
not to seek or support their nationals in aiaertlug any arrangements which saifhfc purport to estab
lish In favor of their Into roots any g e n e r a l su
periority of* rights with respect to o o m m r o t e l or
e c o n o m ic d e v e lo p m e n t I n a n y d e s ig n a t e - r e g i o n o f
th e t e r r i t o r i e s of C h in e *5 7
Article

Vf of the draft of the a g r e e m e n t provided that wany

provisions

of an existing c o n c e s s i o n w h i c h a p p e a r inconsis

tent with thus# of an o t h e r c o n c u s s i o n or w i t h the principles
of the above agreemiit” nlr.ht be referred to a board of referenoe*-5"

Baron Shi debar a. objected to this p r o v i s i o n on the

grounds that It might Imply a retroactive application*

Si r

Hobart Borden proposed that this article be dropped and this
was agreed u p o n by ta* other Power® la attendance*

The

Alne rower ‘
T reaty was signed on February 6th, 1922, by ihe
United States, Japan, Belgium, The British Aspire, China,

••’6Iohtha»hl, o^. £ l t . , p. 305.

J , Xbt<3,, pp. 1*3-1% ..
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Prance# Italy# the Batherlands and Portugal*

In this Tact

the f m ^ T B agreed:
1 * To respect the sovereignty# the independence*
and the territorial and adalvilstrativ* Integrity of
China*
2 * To prov Ida the fullest and most unes&arraeaed
opportunity to China to d a w l o p and maintain for her**
siIf an effective and stable government•
3 * To us# their influx nee for the purpose of effect
ually establishing and maintaining the principle o.f
equal opportunity for the oommeroc and Industry of all
nations throughout the territory of China*
!t« To refrain from taking advantage of the present
conditions in order to see* special rights or privileges

w h i c h would abridge the rights of the subjects or

citizens of friendly states* and from countenancing
motion inimical to the security of such s t a t e s #2 $
Is the r e m a i n i n g articles#

the Towers pledged to carry out

**the principles of the Open Door or equality of opportunity
in China. $13 to refrain from creating nSphere a of .influence;*
to r e spect China f-& right as a neutral In cane

of war? and to

consult with e a c h other “'whenever a situation arises w h i c h

* * * Involves the application of the stipulations of the
pres# ni Treety* * ^
China was not successful in her plea for the termination
of e x t r a t e r r i t o r i a l i t y and further action was postpones until
192J*

*.

m

*

Th* lowers* including Japan* resolved to abolish all
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foreign pact offices within Chinn, effective January X, 1923*
This provision did not apply to the leased territories nor
to fcaoae areas where they were operated with the oonssnt of
An

the Chinese Cover; * m at*

The suntier of the mandate of the le larva of Tap was
settled in a eat la factory manner*

The $cited States and Jap

an signed a treaty on i«*ebruary 1 1 , 1922, which provided that
American citisons would be given

equal footing with Japanese

subjects H n all that relates

to the landing and operation of

the ex i s t i n g Yap^'aem cable,”

or any other a able that the

United States might construct

in the future*

In return,

Washington gave recognition to Tokyo1a stands te over the Island,62
The remaining issue involving the presence of Japan
ese troops in Siberia was quickly resolved when Baron ShtdeIaf6 road a f i fteen minute s p e e c h in w h i c h N i p p o n disclaimed

any designs on Siberia ana promised to evacuate was soon as
a satlafactory settlement of the question shall have been
arranged with an orderly flussian Oovernment*”
The Washington Conference did much to stabilise tho

Treaties and liea glu t Iona of the Conference of the
Limitation of Armament". n T H l *
6 t-3u«ll,

0 £.

alt., pp. l4.ij.S-J+49.
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peace In the Orient and better the strained relations between
Japan on one hand and the United States and China on the
other.

The concessions made by Tokyo at Washington greatly-

raised her stature in the eyes of the Western Powers and pro
vided a temporary improvement in her relations with China.
The success of the Conference was largely due to the dynamic
leadership and persuasion of* Secretary Hughes, who was assist
ed by Mr• Balfour in many of the negotiations with the Japan
ese.

While the Conference was not a. success insofar as the

long term effect upon SIno-Japanese relations were concerned,
it was a far better example of the above hoard conduct of
diplomatic negotiations than the Paris Peace Conference which
preceded it a fdw years before.

G S A P II n V I I

COflCLUSIuK
'Xh© chief diplomatic events which directly contributed
to Japan9a rise in international power and prestige during
the twenty year period, 1902-1922, have been briefly pre
sented.
The years following the arrival of Ferry*s "black
ships** demonstrated to Nippon that the West

had a materialis

tic superiority and technical knowledge which she
gaun In order to develop Into a modern nation.

too must
The treaties

forced upon her by the American and European powers demon
strated Nippon’s lack of governmental and legal knowledge of
diplomatic methods.

The restoration of the emperor would

mark m period of national cohesion and which demonstrated
the Japanese nation as perhaps the most thoroughly Integrated
country in the world.

The constitutions and governmental

machinery, legal codes, armed forces and industrial techniques
were studied in the leading capitals of

theworld In order

to

bring famm to out of the feudal a g e .
The success of the modernisation period was demonstrated
by the crushing defeat over China.

Yet the Triple Inter

vention served as a warning that Tokyo could not expect to
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stand alone again®t

m combination

of nations.

Following her

second major military victory in the Husso-Japanese war,
the Tokyo Government undertook hy a series of treaties,

alliances and "notes* both open and secret, to define her
status in China and Korea.

She Anglo-Japanese Alliance,

first signed in 1902, and renewed in 1905 and 1911, was
Tokyo’s first defensive alliance with any foreign nation, and
it cannot be denied that Japan lived up to the obligations
towards her partner, Britain.
2be World

War years brought

universal condemnation.

Nippon

both

praise

and

While aha participated in the war to

a limited degree, her harsh treatment of China a® represented
by the ” Twenty-One Demands" did much to away world opinion
In

favor of China.

The Faking Government however, was not

entirely without fault.

Avarice for money, power struggles

and national disunity contributed to China’s weakness.

On

one hand, China could deliberately negotiate heavy loans in
volving millions of dollars; on the other, she could disown
them on the grounds that they were not legal in form..
Prince Salonji led his delegation to Paris convinced
that, with the exception of the racial equality issue, Japan

could not possibly lose its case since she had already ob
tained advance approval of two of her desiderata

by

secret
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treaties and agreements concerning the Shantung leasehold and
the German colonies north of the equator.

The achievement of

these two goals gave her a temporary v 1ctory i-^hi c n was to be
partially shattered at the Washington Conference.
Prince Tokugawa and his colleagues went to Washington
in 1921 with a suspicion that Nippon was due to lose some of
her wartime gains.

The open and frank approach of Secretary

Hughes, so contrary to the indirect and vague approach so
peculiar to the oriental concept of "face,11 startled the Japan
ese delegation.

They wholeheartedly joined in the spirit of

the negotiations and one cannot but admire their forthright
manner in negotiating the Five Power Naval Treaty.

By the

terms of this Treaty, Nippon gained a reasonable assurance
that it would not be attacked by either the United States or
Great Britain.

At the same time, Japan was allowed to retain

a relative share of its naval tonnage.
The failure of London to renew the Anglo-Japanese Alli
ance came as a blow to the delegation and indeed, to Japan.
The Four Power Pact, while acceptable in form, was not con
sidered to be in the same light as their first defensive alli
ance which endured the test of time.
The Nine Power Treaty, in turn, was a keen disappoint
ment to China in that it did not go far enough in giving her

complete autonomy over her affairs*

In face of world opin

ion, Tokyo gave Peking some concessions which were at least
equal to those of the Nest*
The matter of the fhantung settlement was hotly de
bated and the mediation of Secretary Hughes and Hr# Balfour
largely aided the two nations in reaching a satisfactory set
tlement#

Trie remaining issues of Tiber la and Tap were easily

disposed of#

In a fifteen minute speech, Baron fhidehara

promised that Japanese troops would leave Liberia*

The Tap

mandate to Japan was confirmed by the American Government;
Nippon, in turn, agreed to grant full us© of the cable sta
tion to the United -States#
The reasons behind Japan’s actions are not treated In
this study#

However, during these twenty years, she was

striving for status and power#

The achievements of these

objective© was readily gained and the events of later history
serves to Illustrate that this is so*
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3 vola * Caobrldge: Ha r v a r d ^ T F H w r o T E / Press, IvpT*
A collection of the letters of the for .nor frosidanfc
dating from 1363 until his death in 1919* In the cited
volume, there Is some coverage of the ores Ident1o role at
tli© for to mouth Poace Jonferenee,

-orison, Jltlnp f.

Reynolds, Francis J*, alion L. Churchill and Francis J*

Filler* The ftory of the Great Wa;»,
p.

•%

’o i m r s ^

3 vols.

r«ew lorn:

~ n 7 T 9i ^ : --------

Another popular series on World Gar 1*, which fives
a O’UO c e tall to' the■military role of Japan*
0*
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Conforenoo on the Lint tat Ion of Apnan*nt» Washington, -"ovenber
i T T T ? 2 T ~ - ~ ^ F r a ~ r T ~?rr'T9'S5.~~'G^asfiTH^ton: "Tovar nuant

?rlriEInc b ' T T o o T f ^ . --A ’’paneh-Snsltsh detailed account of tho ppoooodlncs
at tlio Washington Conference.
forot«n Eolations of tho United - tatoo, 191U: i m - 1 9 2 0 (Tbo
h ^ ;
l ^ T a 3 i r o ~ lTTT r g T T f u S S I S S e n t I); 1919 (Paris- ~
•peeco a o K F e i ^ e e * X, III, V)j 1920, IXlj 1921, XT U a h TEKcSon:""" vov'oriino nfc Ir Inti nr ffflce, 1922, 19^0, 1923,
1931# 19^3# 1936, 1936*
(-Tear of publication listed in
the order cI t o d ).
A collection of notes and other of f i e l d docuuauts pertalnluy to the foreIgn relations of the -J«itod ftat©a for
the years referred to.
This series Is especially valuable
as a primary source of Information*
Gooch, G* P* and Harold Temperley*
(ed*)• fritIsa documents
on the Origins of the far I3o0-191lu
11 volaV * IToationT™
”3aTicm©ry fFFToo, 1*9357
An edited collection of British documents which Is
another oxcollenfc primary source of 'Material*
T.»Is tor.
7 of the Japan©so-Gerima war of 1 9 d * h vols*
Volumes
are on FtXo^^ac ""tlio" 0oanand IirTJ Gono rax wtaff College, ft*
Leavenworth, iunsas and wore translated from Japanese
volumes bear 1nr trie same title in 1933*
ho author or ed
itor’s name is pivon and tho name of the translator Is not
stated ,
A Japanese General ftaff report on world war X aa It
pertained to the Japanese Army and wavy*
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!laoMur ray, r? n V. A., (ed. },

Treat lea and Agreed nt& With
and Cone * *.115.; China 1894*191?*
Z™voTF«
$ew York*
Oxford University Pres*, ifSXT
A collection of at&to paper a arid other documents per
tain:! ng to treaties concerning China and published under
the auspices of the Carnegie En^mamnt for International
peace.

?fane hurl an. Treaties and, Agreements. Washington i Carnegie Zxi~
ment**7or Tnterne tTon&l "feece, 1921.
A short summary of the provisions of treaties concern
ing Manchuria.

The imperial Japanese HistIon to the United States* 1917*
*aa hTnfrEorT:

Carnegie Endowmen€B
'im
f or 1
TnSer y i tlorn 1 Peace,

1913.
A s u M f j of the Xehli Mission13 visit to the United
Stetea .

Treaties and Hesolutions of the Conference on the Limttatlon
o F T^rmamen.t.
19^1*

hew Tork? T ^ d e r a I T ? 5 3 e IHforniaiTon Servfcee,

A short compilation of some of the nor© important
treaties and resolutions at the above conference.
,D.

P'SaiOOtOALS

nArns Conference In Action," Currant History, XV, ho. 3*
(.Doco ubo r , 19^1), p p . x x x - x T T ™ ™
A descriptive article concerning the proceedings at
the opening pliaae of the Washington Conference*
Blake a lee, leorge H* "The Mandates of the Pacific,11 Foreign
Affairs , I { e n tombe r , 19*2)$ 'PP * 99-100*
“ ihort article on the mandated Pacific islands which
includes a discussion of those Islands under the suser&intp
of Japan.
Brebner, J. f * "Canada, the Anglo-Japaneee Alliance and the
Washington Conference,"
Political Science Qn&rtegXg r
(March; 1935), p. 3 3 . --------------*-- ’
A summary of Oaaada’s stand on opposing the renewal of
the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.
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Ferguson* .John 0# **Japan1s Use of Her Hegemony*11 Ilorth
American Heview* OCX (October, 1919)# p* &S>o*
A n anaTysis"**of Tilppon’e plan to extand Aar Influence
and control on the smlnland of Asia*
Flfteld, Has ©all H* "Japan© a© rolioy toward the Shantung
Questions at the far la ?©ao© Conference,11 f'h© J o a m I
of Modern History# XXIII (fcptember# 1 9 5 1 )» p* 2 5 7 T ~
J T suarmry o F the Japan©©© stand on the Shantung las us#
Jenks* Jeremiah W.

* Japan In Act ton#11 fforfeh Amori can Hevlaw

COX (September# 1919)# ?* 319#
A new# article concerning Japanese negotiations during
the tan# ing«»Xeh 11 <21sousa Iona *

"The Dlimrmauont Conference,"

Current History# (September*
---------------------------- p . 91?*
An article which In part da© ©ribas
the effect upon
the Japanese public of the Invitation for Nippon to
attend the Washington Conference*
1 9 2 1 ),

Young# Hobart#
wJapan at Klaoohcv and the Peace Conferon©©,11
the Contemporary Hey ley* CX¥ (March# 1919)* p« 231*
<^ ^ i ’^ r 5 s W t 5 9 S n t o f nT o e Japan ese p o s i t i o n a t hiaoohow
and her negotiations at the Paris Peace Conference*

e*

mvmtxsEttD m t m mi,s

Case# Honor*
"The Capture of TaIngtau#
unpublished research
study# The Command and General staff school# Fort
Leave nw or fch# Kansas, 1933*
An excellent military s tn a y o f the cam paign f o r th e
capture o f Tsingtau, complete with maps and doeumant&ti on.
from both Japanese and German nnarcoa*
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Baker# Hay s*

Dlrector# United States Preee
Bureau* M r 1b Peace Conference*

Blias* General Tasker H*

United States Delegate to the
Faria Peace Conference*

Bryan* Milllam Jennings

U* 5# Secretary of state*

Cecil# Lord Hobart*

British Undersecretary of
L ta te *

Chang#

Chiu#st ulnlater at Tokyo*

Chlnda#

?*ung«*hs lang
Suteml

Japanese Ambassador at London
and .Delegate to the Faria
leaae Conference*

Class® nceau# George a

President of the Council of the
Hepatite and leader of the French
Delegation to the far to Peace
Conference*

Cursors# Lord ueer&e !**

British foreign Minister*

Belceaae# Ttaoophlle

French Foreign Minleter*

fiilmora# Hillard

rreaident of toe United States*

Gcor&c# Lav Id Lloyd

British Prlae Minister*

Goto# Sn impel

Japanese Minister of Foreign
Affairs*

Graves# General william f*

C o l a n d e r of American Forces In
Lxber <&&*

Greene* sir

British Ambassador at Tokyo*

3*

Qrmjp Sir fdward

British Foreign Secretary*

Hanabuset

' t m h lmoto

Japanoaa Minister to Korea*

Hanlhara*

iaaiuao

Japanese ¥ loo-For©ign Hlnlatar *

Harding, Barron O*

Fro#Id#tat of the United atetee#

Harris, Towmmnd

Amor loan dounaul at Japan*.

Bay, John

T?*S* s t s r t l w y of state*

llay&s 'hi, $ad*a u

J&paneae Minister at London*

Hiokl* Ski

Japanese Minister to China*

Horvat* Q m w m l Dmitri h*

Manager of the Chinese~£aatern
Hallway and UnaaIan antl~Soi«he*»
vik loader*

lloua#, lldw&rd H*

Delcgato to tiat Farts Feaoc Con<»
ferenee*

Hughes, Charles JSrana

U* s* Secretary of state*

Hughes, ¥♦ M*

Auatrellan Prime Minister and Lola
gat# to the Paris
Conference

Ijuln, H*

Japanese Lelegute to the Part#
Peace Conference*

Xneuye, K'aoru

Japanese Foreign Minister and
Elder Etafcesnan*

Xahll,

A.V

Ikujira

Japanese Fpoolai d m oy to the
United States*

I to# Hi rob urn1

Japanese Elder stat#asmn and
fiea ide &fc«*Gene ra i of Korea*

Xjaaltsu

Japaricee Shogun*

Kamio» General

Japanese 0 osamandcr in hat tie
for capture of Tainrtao*

KfttoV fakaak 1

Japan*a* Foreign Kinlater*

Reren&ky, A.

header of Huestan Provisional
Governs* a t .

Kas&npa,

Japanese Poreiga Minister*

Jot t a r o

h o o f 7#X# cellington

Chine*e Hints ter at tfaahlngtoa and
13*legate to the Parle Peace 3o&*

tersnoe#
Lansing, ftc&art

Secretary of state#

Li Huag-ohang

Chlnaae 7io*roy#

Li Yuan**hung

ircaiiient o* ^hlna#

Lvov, Oeor&ii

frlti# KIniafcer o.f rrovinloiml

Haas Ian Goversuaani#
Ifaklno, Tlofou&kl

Japanese Lelogat© to the Parle
Poae# Conference#

1 % 'te u L , ?!# tl*

Japanese Delegate to tiie Par la
?*aoe Conferexie*#

M o ig h o a , A u th o r

Canadian rrlmm Minister#

Morris, Hol&ud &#

& m v i c m n A m LaeeaLor at fokyo*.

oto tm f ah tge « ofcu

Japanese foreign i'ltnJksfcer#

Perry, Hatthaw G*

Aaorioa,u Adr&iral (then 0 amoclare)*

Plun&ats* Y* H*

British Kinlater to Japan.

Ha loseh, Paul S#

juseriaan 3 taletar at Peking*

Hoooevuit# fhooJo**

•fraoXdent of tne Joiv0G »•■
*
•t&toe#

H o o t, .E lih n

Secretary of State*

Sa 1or*ji * K I m o 0 hi

Leader of the Japanese Delegation
at
Paris
Conference#
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A*
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Sensexxov* Crogory

Hueelan Coee&ek Military header*

Shldehara* Eijuro

inibaeaader to the United
state# and Delegate to tlm Wash
ington Conference*

Smite # <3ans Chr 1 * tInn

South African .0#legate to the
Paris Fete# Conference*

Spring-Klee* Cecil

British Minister at Washington*

sun-T&t-sen

Chinese Revolutionary Leader*

dse, S&o-Ke Alfred

Chines# Minister at London and
Helegate to the Pari# ?eao#
Confer*nee*

?*Jfcahira# Baron

Japanese As&aeeador to Urn
'United states*

Tolcugawa, Prin.oe

Freeident of the House of Poors
and loader of the Japeneee Dele
gation to the Washington Corr*
ferenee*

Tuan* Chi-jnl

Chinese Prime Minister*

Tt*u H®1

Chinee* D w i p i 1 SSEtpreee*
fa at

von ifekhardatatn# Baron
London*'
Vang* 0* ?»

Chinee* Delegate to the Faria
feae# Oonfereooe*

Wei, Santo how

Chines# Delegate to the Laris
feaoe Qenfereno# *

Mils on, fc'oodraw

President of the United States*

Witte* Sergei

Hue e lan HI n la ter ox* Pina nee*

Tuan Shlh-k’&i

President of China.*

1

ABB ABA

B:B.j'.

:r:

,x;?a a:-:./ xoaaa, jaS'Jaht 3 0 ,

?■

90

The 3 over rtraenta of Great Britain and Japan# actuated
solely by a dec Ire to mairit&lu the statua quo and general
peace in" the extrema Bast, bel n& moreover specially laterals ted
In maintain
the independence and territorial Integrity of
Empire of l i d p e of China and th© Aspire of Corea and in
securing e<$u*~l opportunities in those eountrles for the commerce and Industry of all nations, hereby agree as follow®j
Artla1# 1* The High Contrast!ng fartloa having
mutually rooo, I eel tit* lnd@pen.de tic© of Chism and Corea de
clare t-se usalv*, t o t # entirely uninfluenced by any aggres
sive tendencies In either country#
Having in view however,
theIf epee laX Internsfc®, of which those of Croat Britain re
late principally to China# while Japan# in. addition to the
.interest# which ah© possesses In China, Is Interested In a
peculiar degree politically as well a© commercially and In
dustrially In Corea# the High Contracting ;urtle$ recognise
inti it will be admissible for ©it' ex* of'them to safeguard
thcee Intereate If threatened either by the aggreasIve action
of any other iorer, or by disturbances arising in China or
Corea* and ne< * ~ Itabing the Intervention of either of the
’U g h ContractI
’arfcles for the protection of the 11 vac and
property of it ^lb jests-*
Article XX* If olti'jer Or#at Britain or Japan# In the
defence of their respective Interests as above described#
should become involved In war with another fawvr, the other
high Contrasting Party will maintain a strict neutrality,
and use Its efforts to prevent other bowera from joining In
hostilities egainst Its ally#
Article III*
If# In the above event, any other Iower
or rowera should Join li h>stillties against that ally, the
at hex* BIgn Contracting <arty will oooo to its a® slats no a
and will conduct the war in common, and mate© peace in nutu&I
agreement wlfcli it*

\*3riti&h X3ooument& on ti*© friglas of the war# II#
pp# lip-XTvT* ~ ~
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Article IV* the Sigh. Contract trig Parties agree
t'h&t neither of them will, without consulting tha other,
enter Into separate arrangement* with another Power to
t1h» pro jud la a of the 1n teran ts ahove described#
Article V* whenever, in the opinion of either Great
Britain or Japan, the above~3ient toned interests are In
Jeopardy, the two Cover mien is will e o m u n l e a t e with o m
another fully and frankly*
Article VI# The present Agreenent shall ooue into of foot
i m e d lately after the date of Its signature, and regain In
force for five ye&r^ froa that date*
In case neither of the High Contracting Parties shall
have notified twelve months before the expiration of the
said five years the intention of terminating it, It shall
r©js«in hind lug until the expiration of one year fro&i the day
on which either of trie hl;;h Contracting 2art lea shall have
denounced it* But if, wuen the date fixed for its expiration
arrives, e Ither ally ,1s actually engaged in war, the alliance
shall, Ipso facto, continue until peace in concluded#
la faith whereof, ©te*
Done in duplicate at London, the 3'Cth day of January,
1902*

iJiHA^i'rAUU
HAiASnX
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AVfmijix o
■? m x r - m r i m THE IGThGurri ■•'J CuIbA, TJU ••AhluU.
PEACE OP KAIT£;3J A:tA AhD tMiJ TA APE E P TABhifGhXAL HIOATS
kUD special x x T ^ m y m ow tap fahtx... ip tbgsu isegigus
A 11PIP' T 12, 1905
The Government of Great Britain and Japan, being
desirous of roplaolag the Agreement concluded between them
on tbe 30 th January 1902, by fresh stipulations, nave agreed
upon the following Articles, which have for their object:
(a) The consolidation and aaaintenanc© of the general
peaoo In the regions of lectern Asia arid India#
(b) Tiie 'preaervation of the © o m o n Interests of all
powers In China, by injuring the independence and integrity
of the Chinese HaspIre and tlic principle of equal opportunities
for the aonmeroe and industry of ©11 nations in China*
Co) The maintenance of the territorial rinuts of the
High Contracting Parties in the regions of Baatern *>sia and
of India , and the defence of t-hclr special interests In the
said regions#
Article I#
It in agreed that whenever, In the opinion
of © ifcner Great Britain or Japan* any of the rights and Inter
ests referred to in the preamble of this Agreement arc in
jeopardy, tlm two (Governments will communicate with one another
fully and frankly, and will consider In coramon the measures
which should be taken, to -safeguard those menaced rights or
Interests.
Article II#
If by reason of unprovoked attach or
agreeslv© action, wherever arista* , on the part of any other
Power or Powers either GDetracting Party should ha Involved
In war In defence of Its territorial rights or special inter
ests sent I »nj- in the preamble of this Agreement, the other
Contract' *
arty will at one a com© to the assistance of its
ally, any wilr conduct the wax* in oosaoii, and smke peace In
mutual agreement with it.

ritlsh Documents on the hr

pp. 16>-T

of the V/ar» IV,
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Article lit.
Japan possessing paramount political,
military* and eoonomle Interests In Corea, Great Britain
recognises the right of Japan to take aucn measures of
guidance, control, and protection in Corea a* she nay do eta
proper and necessary to safeguard and advance those interests,
provided always that such treasures arc not contrary to too
principle of equal opportunities} for the commerce and indus
try of all nations#
Art to la XV* Ore at Britain having a open lal Intercut
In all that concerns the security of the Indian frontier,
Japan recognises her* right to take such measures in ti*e proximity
of that frontier as- nsm nay find necessary for safeguarding
her Indian possess Ions#
Article 7* The
1
Contracting fartlas agree that
neither o f t is j will, w*t out consulting the other, enter into
separate arrange ;aotii wit another Power to th# prejudtoo of
the objects described in i-e preamble of this Agreement#
Article 71* As regard-a the present war between Japan
and hassla, Great Britain will continue to maintain strict
neutrality unless some *t -j; rowor or Powers should join
in hostilities against oapi'u, in which case Great Britain
will eo:w to toe as a Is tanc# of Japan, and will conduct tue
war in common, and ma&e peace in mutual agreement with
Japan#
A r t i c l e Vt X# -The c o n d it io n s u n d e r w h ic h ar-rf*^ a s s is ta n c e
s h a l l be afforded by cither Power to t o other i n fc**j c ire urns ta n c e s n»o.ifclrm & o in th e p ro & e n t A g r^e * o t , n n d t o
eano b y
w h ic h auc:i a s s is ta n c e Is to be .mad© a v a i l a b l e , w i l j , oe a rr a n g e d
by the Bevel and Nilifcary a u t
* ’ *Ie« of the C o n t r a c t in g Par
ties who will fro-', tl oe to t l i
w irn s u it on# anot.her f u l l y and
freely upon all questions of mutual interests.

Article VIII#
The pre jo r.t Agraenavit a ball, sub joe t to
the provisions of article VI,
o
into offset immediately
after the date of its s I g n a t o v , and re m i n In force for tan
year o f r o i t an t B a ta •

In oaae neither of the High Jontr&cting Fart las should
have notified twelve ninths before th© expiration of the said
tan years the intention of terminating it* It anaII remain
binding until tri# expiration of one year from the day on which
either ’of the High Contracting Parties shall have denounceci it*
Dut if, when the* date fixed for its expiration arrives, either
ally is actually engaged In war, the alliance shall ipso facto,
continue until peace is concluded*
In faith whereof etc*
Done in duplicate at London, the 12th day of August, 19Gj>*
[l*f *1 LA I'*t jj^jtvliL
Hi a Hrittanic Mmj©sfcy1a PrXno ip&l
Secretary of state
for Foreign Affairs*

Jl .s .1 ?a o a £'* HttM&ni
-

Envoy i3xtra ordinary
and Minister Pleni
potentiary of lie
Ma Je a ty the
tpor or
of Japan at
Court of St* James*
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The Ooverrcaent of Groat Britain ana th© O o w m n e n t of
Japan, leaving in view trio important changes which have ban©a
place in the-situation since the ocmelviaion of the AngloJapensa© Agreement of the 12th of August 190$, and believing
that revision of that Agreement responding to such changes
•would contribute to general stability an4 repose, have agreed
upon the following stipulations to replace the Agreement
above mentioned, such stipulations having the same object as
the said Agrees!©r»t# namely;
peace

(a) fli® consolidation ana \3&lr*fcenance of the general
In the regions of has tern Asia and of India#

(b) fhe preaervet <,
of the c o w n interacts of all
fowors In China by Irisurl
the indopenaeaao and integrity
of the Chinese hup ire ana fc.u. principle of equal opportunities
for the © a m e r c e and industry of all nations in China*
{©) fh© m i n t © nance of the territorial rights of the
High Contracting fartlee In the ro uons of haatcro Asia
and of India, and the defence of t olr special Interacts* in
th a said re g 1o rm t
Article I*
It Is anxo^w that whenever, In, the opinion
of either Great Britain or Ju >an, any of the rl fits and
Inters© t© referred to In. the preamble of this ^grcsmoufc are
in jeopardy, the two Gtatvernmente will communicate with one
another fully and frankly, mad will consider In common the
m a « u r © » which should b® taken to safeguard those menaced
r i i\b® and 1ntorecta*
Article II*
If by reason of unprovoked attack or
aggressive actio?;, wherever ©.rising, on the part of any bower

^^British Doe,am© nts on the Or ini us of the, B a r , 71II.
pp* S3

or .Powers, either High Contracting Party should be involved
in war in defence of Its territorial rlekts or special
luteresto mentioned in the preamble of tala Byres~o ,t, the
other high hontraoting party will at ones some to t *o assist
ance of Its ally, and "will conduct the war in so? o , and
m k f peace in mutual agreement with It*

Article III*
The high Contracting Pmrilec agree that
neither of them will, without eormultlng tha other, enter In
to separate arrangeswnts with another rower to the prejudice of
the obj^ats described in the preamble of this Agreement*
Article 17*
should cither high Contracting Party con
clude a treaty of general arbitration with a third Power, it
is agreed that nothin' in this Agreement shall entail upon
such Contracting Tarty an obligation to go to war with the
Power with whom "such treaty of arbitration 1$ in force*
Article 7* The condition© under which m & m a mseiat&ne#
shall be afforded by either owe? to the other in the cire urnstanceo mentioned In the ?ro .* .t Agreement, and the .moans by
which such assistance is t" °o urnd# available, will be arranged
by the Bemh. and Billtary authortties of the High Contracting
Partias, who will from tine to t" 03 consult 000 another fully
and freely upon all questions’ o
-Jttual Interest*
rtl^le 71* The pro coot Agreement shall oomo Into
of foot * aw lately after too data of Its aigrmture, and remain
iu force for tea yearn fro** tHat data*
In oaso neither of the
High Contracting Parties j
*i have notified twelve m i *
before the expiration, of ^ v «eld ten year® the IntentI > of
terminating it, it shall remain binding until the, expiration
of cue year from the day on which either of the i.tg*. Contrac
ting Parties? shall have denounced It* But If, when the da to
fim d for its expiration arrives, either ally Is actually en
gaged In war, the alliance shall, Ipso facto# continue until
p*aoo is concluded#
* *” '
’
In faith whereof, etc*

Bone In duplicate at London, on the 13th day of duly 1911
&• GBtiT
.Bis Hr11 ta 111a v'"ajea ty *a
Principal Pecrotary of Ht&to
for Foreign Affairs#
BAhhiUiI iuiTO,
Ambassador Axtraordinary a no
Plenipotentiary of his Hmjes
ty the Bmperor of Japan at
the Court of p fc* Jamaa#

APPSKDXX 1
TUG T'UinTf Go AMhGIATXOG# SXG^IW AIJCHfST 2 O T , 1910 B M t m m
RJHX J&H 1VCIHNSEAL ?XSG0Ullf TSRAUCBI A HD MR# XX WAtf-XOHO*
n t n x ^ v m imstDEiiT of
o:? eosea*1
A-tlTXCLis.' X
The Emperor of Korea to smk© complete ana permanent
evasion to tha Emperor of Japan of all eights and sovereignty

over tha whole of Korea*
AiiTICLS XI

The Emperor of Japan, to accept tha above-mentioned
©©©©ton# a nd to oonaent to tha complete mmwxutton of Korea
to the Empire of Japan*
ARTICLE III

Ttm j£mp®vox* of Japan to accord to the Emperor of A or© a*
ex>I&3?erar ana Oronn Frina© of Korea end their Consorts ©ueh
feitlea* dignities* ftod honors &s are appropriate to their
respective V o n k s # and sufficient annual grant© to be mad©

for'th© maintenance of ©uoh titles* dignities and honours#
A i m C L S 19

ft*© relative© of the Emperor of Korea also to receive
slue dignities# titles * honours and solatia#
AHXICXjS f
The Emperor of Japan to confer peerage© and monetary
grant© upon 'Koreans Mho, on account of meritorious services
are regarded a® deserving, epeeial recognition#

A i m C L E VX
In consequence of the? afores&la Annexation# tha Governmeat of Japan will aiauna tn© out Ire goverwaen t and administra
tion of Chosen and undertafc* to afford full protection for ta©
life and properfcy of Koreans obeying the law© In force# and to
promote tho welfare of all ouch*

jumcLG m il
The Government of Japan# so far as ciroumaianoes
permit will employ ira the public aervIce of Japan# Koreans
who accept the new re&isa© loyally and in good faith and who
are duly qualified For'subh aarvlce*
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TEXT OF TEE JAPAIJEOE Bfc&LA.UTICtf OF Ehi AGa IFF T OiwiFAKr"
We hereby declare war against Germany find we oom&and
our A ray and F&vy to carry 0 3 hostilltlea against that em
pire with all toeir strength, and we also command all our
competent authorities to o&lco every effort in pursuance of
their respective duties to attain the national a If within
the U n i t of the law of nations*
Since the outbreak of the yreaont war in Europe#
the calamitous effort of which wo vict? with grave concern,
vc, on our part* h a m entertained ines of preserving the
peace of t m Far Fast by the m i n t * * *co of strict neutrali
ty, but the action of 0©r--mny has at Xe tn compelled Treat
■Oritain, our ally* to open hostilities v cinst that country,
and Ccrmny Ic ci Klao~uh.au, its leaser territory in China,
busy with war 1,
prepara!'ions, while her © m e d veroala,
cruising the n . " of western As la, are threaten In - our
eon cure a and a -** of our slip. The peace of the "ar fast la
thur In jeopardy#
Accordingly, our Government and that of hia Eritannic
Fsjacty, after a full and frank 0 ommuulcation with each other,
agreed to take such measures as nay b© neeessary for the
protection of t m general inter©' t conte plated la the agree
ment of alliance, and we 00 our part, boing desirous to
attain that object by peaceful n a s m * ©o?‘
W <nbed our fo^orn^at
to offer* with sincerity, an advlo© to the hornan Cover incut#
Fy tiuj lani Fay appointee for the purpose, however, our hov
er ih?w*r«t failed to receive an answer accept 1
>nr advice*
It is wit.n profound xugrct that v«, - ^plte of our
arwew.t devotion to i.a© cavu© of peace, arc t
compelled
to declare war* ea-peolalX/ fox* our
mtaer.
It is our or m e t wish that, by the loyal by and valor
of our faithful subject*, pnuco m y coon be restored and fch®
glory of the empire ^nhEfiSfc*

'
4ir,lpt:orf; of t lit* Ffcpa;.oLo-fer •igi gas* of 1 Oil*9 (trans
la t i o n fF5*-F tHe ^bin©s<r^Trprl;.5r*r i ™ c o

a.nc ’olf .fix© at

Fdu11!!r*a r v>t General Ftaf.f loll©go, 'rort beav,;twort-U, Fanses),
T, op, 10-.11.

A.PPSS0IX a
Exc:uvr«a r>? kot^s,

ms

Bote from, the.. yecrefc&ry of r u t e

19171

tp the Japanese Ambassador
DhmhThhh? w
Vlas hi net on*

ufATh
K o r os&er Z $ 1 9 1 1

£&q olio 007:
I have the honor to eorriunlo&te therein ny unde ret aridtng
of the agreement r e M h e d b y us In our recant conversations
touching the questions of mutual Intercut to our governmeate
r e l a t i n g to the Hepublie of China*
In order to silence mischievous xv, 5jr*t that have from

time to time been circulated it is believe** by us that m public
announcement once more of t he dec irea and latentions shared by
our two govern; meats with regard to China In advisable*
The governments of the United utatcs and Japan recognise
that -territorial propinquity creates special relations between
countries* and consequently, the government of the halted
its tee recognised that Jape? iur? special interests la China,
particularly In the part to *• itch her possess lone arc contiguous*
The Territorial a o vere i^nty of China, never the la sirs,
re-roe ins unlm aired and the government of the United .tafces has
every cotif ideurj in the repeated assurances cf the Tu.serial
Jopaneao government that while geographical position -luce
Japan such special interests they -have no deaira to ulscrlruloate against fcne trade of other nations or to disregard the
ooswiero1©1 rights heretofore grantee by J h h m in treaties with
other powers*
The governments of tne United ifcstos and Japan deny that
they have any purpose to Infringe In any w a g the Independence
or territorial Integrity of China, ana they declare, further**
more, that they always adhere to the principle of the sa-o&Xied
rfop€ii d o o r ” or equal opp o r t u n i t y for commerce and

Indies try in
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Moreover* they mutually declare that they sr« opposed
to the acquisition by any government of any special rights
or privileges that would affect the independence or territorial
integrity of China or that would deny to the subjects or
citizens of any country the full enjoyment of equal opportunity
in the commerce and industry of Chin®#
1 shall be glad to have four Excellency confirm this
understending of the agreement reached by us.
Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurance of my highest
cons idmrmtion.
(Signed)

Robert Lansing

Mots .from the Japanese Ambassador to the Secretary of State
ms

Si'BCML KiSSiOK OF JAFAtf

Washington, Hovernier 2 a 1917
Sirs
I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note
of today, eoxmmmica ting to mm your under standing of the
agreement reached by us in our recent conversation touching
the questions of mutual interests; to our governments relating
to the republic of China.
1 am happy to be able to confirm to you, under authorisa
tion of my government, the undera tending in question set
forth in the following termss
Her© the special Ambassador repeats the language of the
agreement as given in Secretary Lansing’s note.
(Sign©d ) E . Xshii
Ambassador Extraordinary and
Plenipotentiary of Japan
on Special Flags Ion
Honorable Robert Lansing
Secretary of’ State

